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Home Court filings USA v. Ayvazyan et al — Arman Hayrapetyan filings, C.D. Cal. REPLY in support of Third MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Or Argument That… — USA…

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REPLY in support of Third MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Or Argument That… — USA v. Ayvazyan et al (Dkt. 438)

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Central District of California
Filed2021-06-07

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW · Doc. 438 · 2021-06-07 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

The government's reply in support of its Motion in Limine #3 (ECF 390) in USA v. Ayvazyan et al, No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, filed June 7, 2021 as Doc. 438. The motion seeks to exclude evidence or argument that the October 19-20, 2020 border stop at Miami International Airport and the November 5, 2020 premises searches were unlawful. The reply accepts that Richard Ayvazyan's defense may question the quality of the investigation within limits, but argues that claims about how the searches were carried out concern suppression issues the court already decided. It also asks the court to bar arguments of vindictive prosecution, outrageous government conduct or tainted evidence, noting that the court has ordered a post-trial Kastigar hearing. The reply runs 12 pages.

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TRACY L. WILKISON 
Acting United States Attorney 
SCOTT M. GARRINGER 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Criminal Division 
SCOTT PAETTY (Cal. Bar No. 274719) 
CATHERINE AHN (Cal. Bar No. 248286) 
BRIAN FAERSTEIN (Cal. Bar No. 274850) 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
Major Frauds/Environmental and Community Safety Crimes Sections 
1100/1300 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
Telephone: (213) 894-6527/2424/3819 
Facsimile: (213) 894-6269/0141 
E-mail: 
 Scott.Paetty@usdoj.gov 
 
 Catherine.S.Ahn@usdoj.gov 
 
 Brian.Faerstein@usdoj.gov 
 
DANIEL S. KAHN 
Acting Chief, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
CHRISTOPHER FENTON 
Trial Attorney, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
1400 New York Avenue NW, 3rd Floor 
Washington, DC 20530 
Telephone: (202) 320-0539 
Facsimile: (202) 514-0152 
 
E-mail: 
  Christopher.Fenton@usdoj.gov 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
RICHARD AYVAZYAN, 
aka “Richard Avazian” and 
    “Iuliia Zhadko,” 
MARIETTA TERABELIAN, 
  aka “Marietta Abelian” and     
      “Viktoria Kauichko,” 
ARTUR AYVAZYAN, 
aka “Arthur Ayvazyan,” and 
TAMARA DADYAN, 
MANUK GRIGORYAN, 
  aka “Mike Grigoryan,” and 
      “Anton Kudiumov,” 
ARMAN HAYRAPETYAN, 
EDVARD PARONYAN, 
aka “Edvard Paronian” and 
    “Edward Paronyan,” and 
VAHE DADYAN, 
No. CR 20-579(A)-SVW 
GOVERNMENT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS MOTION IN LIMINE #3 TO EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT THAT OCTOBER 
19-20, 2020 MIAMI BORDER STOP AND 
NOVEMBER 5, 2020 PREMISES SEARCHES 
WERE UNLAWFUL 
Hearing Date: June 14, 2021 
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m. 
Trial Date:   June 15, 2021 
Location:     Courtroom of the  
             Hon. Stephen V.  
             Wilson  
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Defendants. 
 
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel 
of record, the Acting United States Attorney for the Central District 
of California, Assistant United States Attorneys Scott Paetty, 
Catherine S. Ahn, and Brian Faerstein, and Department of Justice 
Trial Attorney Christopher Fenton, hereby files its reply in support 
of its motion in limine #3 to exclude evidence and arguments, 
including on cross examination of government witnesses, that the 
border stop on October 19-20, 2020 at the Miami International Airport 
and the premises searches conducted on November 5, 2020 were unlawful 
(ECF 390).  This reply is based upon the attached memorandum of 
points and authorities, the files and records in this case, and such 
further evidence and argument as the Court may permit. 
Dated: June 7, 2021 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
TRACY L. WILKISON 
Acting United States Attorney 
 
SCOTT M. GARRINGER 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Criminal Division 
 
 
      /s/ 
 
SCOTT PAETTY 
CATHERINE AHN 
BRIAN FAERSTEIN 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
CHRISTOPHER FENTON 
Department of Justice Trial Attorney 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
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REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
The government’s motion in limine no. 3 seeks to exclude 
evidence and argument at trial that the border search in Miami or 
subsequent residence searches in this case were unlawful or violated 
defendants’ constitutional rights.  (ECF 390.)  The legality of these 
searches and attendant conduct have been litigated extensively and 
ruled upon by the Court, and such issues are improper and irrelevant 
to the jury’s consideration of guilt in this case. 
Defendant Richard Ayvazyan’s (“defendant”) opposition states 
that he will not “argue to the jury that the investigatory activities 
were illegal but rather that they were emblematic of a shoddy 
investigation by law enforcement officials who had already concluded 
the defendants were guilty.”  (ECF 417 at 1.)  But defendant 
realleges factual matters, including purported “military-style raids” 
and accusations of “being a terrorist,” that pertain solely to the 
legality of the searches in this case and not to any issues at trial, 
while also insinuating his intent to raise other due process 
allegations for the jury’s consideration.   
This reply addresses defendant’s mistaken contentions as to the 
permissible bounds of questioning the government’s investigation at 
trial.  The government also responds to what it perceives to be 
defendant’s intention to make arguments at trial sounding in 
vindictive or discriminatory prosecution or outrageous government 
conduct, or arguing issues related to the purported “taint” of the 
government’s evidence to the jury, all of which are improper as a 
matter of law. 
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I. 
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT AT TRIAL REGARDING THE ALLEGED UNLAWFULNESS 
OF GOVERNMENT SEARCHES UNDER THE GUISE OF QUESTIONING THE 
QUALITY OF THE INVESTIGATION IS IMPROPER 
Defendant contends that he will ask the jury “to assess critical 
questions regarding the completeness and efficacy of the government’s 
investigation,” relying, in substantial part, on United States v. 
Sager, 227 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).  (ECF at 4, 5, 6.)  The 
government does not dispute that the defense may, within prescribed 
limits and with adequate foundation, question at trial the “quality 
of the [government’s] investigation,” alleged defects in the 
evidence, or the credibility and potential bias of the government’s 
witnesses.  Sager, 227 F.3d at 1145, 1146. 
Inquiries about the government’s investigation are not without 
limits, however.  As the Sager court observed, “[i]n circumstances 
different from these, a court may properly decide that such a line of 
investigation is to be limited for some independent evidentiary 
reason, such as that the evidence would be cumulative.”  Id. at 1146 
(citing United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1266 (9th Cir. 
1989)).  Similarly, in United States v. Yagman, this Court recognized 
that “Sager does not give Defendant carte blanche to attack all 
aspects of the [government’s] investigation,” including where “the 
relevance of such evidence would be substantially outweighed by the 
risk of jury confusion, undue delay, and prejudice.”  United States 
v. Yagman, CR 06-227(A)-SVW, 2007 WL 9724391, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 
16, 2007); see also United States v. Yagman, 345 F. App’x 312, 314 
n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming court’s exclusion of defense proposed 
“framing” evidence and noting “none of the proffered testimony would 
have raised any concerns over the credibility or validity of any of 
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the documentary evidence produced during the government’s 
investigation”). 
Here, in elaborating on the anticipated scope of his inquiry 
about the government’s investigation, defendant states his intention 
to raise with the jury allegations pertaining to the execution of the 
searches in this case that have no relevance to the issues at trial.  
For instance, defendant once again contends that he was “wrongfully 
accused of being a terrorist” and “l[ied] to . . . about whether he 
was entitled to a lawyer.”  (ECF 417 at 2, 4.)  He also points once 
again to purported “military-style raids of the defendants’ homes 
that involved the harassment of the defendants’ children.”  (Id. at 
2.)  Putting aside the inaccuracy and exaggeration of these 
allegations, which the parties litigated extensively in pretrial 
motions, these and other potential claims relating to the manner and 
execution of the border search and premises warrants are irrelevant 
to the jury’s consideration of the evidence at trial, including any 
purported gaps in the government’s investigation.   
Among other things, these issues pertain (and pertained) solely 
to the Court’s evaluation of defendants’ suppression arguments.  As 
noted in the government’s moving brief, United States v. Reed, 575 
F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009), is instructive.  There, the district court 
excluded defense expert testimony at trial where the defense “sought 
to present the same evidence adduced at the hearings on the renewed 
motion to suppress” relating to alleged “‘anomalies’ in the wiretap 
that could indicate that the Government was conducting illegal 
wiretaps.”  Id. at 919.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s exclusion of the evidence, reasoning that the “legality of a 
wiretap and the question of whether the Government had a warrant for 
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a wiretap is not a question for the jury to consider, because it is 
not immediately relevant to the question of guilt.”  Id. (citing 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960)); see also Jones, 
362 U.S. at 264 (requirement that motions to suppress “be made before 
trial . . . is designed to eliminate from the trial disputes over 
police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt”).  
The legality of the searches in this case and purported 
constitutional violations relating thereto are not “immediately 
relevant to the question of guilt” and thus are irrelevant and carry 
no probative value at trial.   
Defendant’s anticipated arguments about the conduct of Customs 
and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers in Miami and law enforcement 
executing the premises search warrants in this District similarly are 
irrelevant to issues of guilt.  Defendant has not proffered any 
credible information, other than repeated broad and baseless attacks 
leveled at law enforcement and government personnel, calling into 
question the validity and integrity of the actual admissible evidence 
obtained as a result of the border and premises searches.  See 
Yagman, 345 F. App’x at 314 n.1.    
Moreover, any alleged deficiencies in CBP’s questioning of 
defendant or its border search procedures have already been litigated 
and ruled upon by the Court.  CBP’s role in the investigation was 
minimal in any event.  The investigation was conducted primarily by 
the United States Small Business Administration, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation 
Division.  These agencies, not CBP, directed the course of the 
investigation.  CBP became involved only briefly by virtue of 
defendant’s decision to fly through Miami on the way back from Turks 
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& Caicos, and CBP’s involvement was limited to conducting its border 
search procedures during this limited window of time.  In his 
opposition, defendant identifies the government’s strategic choices 
and guiding theories of culpability as the primary purported bases of 
relevance for introducing evidence about the government’s 
investigation.  (See generally ECF 417.)  But details about CBP’s 
activities, while relevant to the Court’s earlier rulings on the 
border search, are irrelevant to these broader issues or to any fact 
of consequence at trial.  Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. 
Nor is information relating to law enforcement’s tactical 
preparation and safety precautions for the premises search warrants 
on November 5, 2020 relevant to issues pertaining to the government’s 
broader investigatory strategy.  Defendant takes issue with the 
government’s potential need to introduce rebuttal evidence regarding 
law enforcement’s belief about defendant’s and several codefendants’ 
association with Armenian Power and possession of numerous firearms.  
(ECF 417 at 7-8.)  Defendant challenges the factual foundation for 
this information, which the government has explained in multiple 
filings in this case.  (See ECF 188 at 4-6; ECF 207 at 4-6; ECF 310 
at 13-15).  Defendant also posits that the government would be 
seeking to obtain convictions based on his and his codefendants’ 
“shared Armenian ethnicity.”  (Id. at 7.)  The government intends to 
do nothing of the kind, but defendant misses the larger point.  The 
government does not intend to introduce any evidence regarding 
Armenian Power or any of the defendants’ possession or suspected 
possession of firearms.  But it would be required to do so if 
defendant opens the door to issues of law enforcement safety and 
tactics by injecting irrelevant issues regarding “military-style 
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raids” into trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Wales, 977 F.2d 1323, 
1326 (9th Cir. 1992) (evidence about false driver’s licenses 
admissible where defense “opened the door” on cross-examination); 
United States v. Segall, 833 F.2d 144, 148 (9th Cir. 1987) (evidence 
about bank account funds admissible where defense “opened the door” 
and created “false impression” on cross-examination). 
Balanced against the lack of any probative value of evidence or 
arguments regarding the purported unlawfulness of the searches in 
this case, defendant’s retreaded attacks on this basis would pose a 
substantial danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, and wasting time.  Fed. R. Evid. 
403.  The Court already has considered and ruled upon the factual 
contentions pertaining directly to the suppression motions in this 
case, as is required.  Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).  Allowing the jury to 
hear evidence relating to admissibility issues but untethered to any 
credible information calling into question the actual integrity of 
the evidence obtained from the searches would only mislead and 
confuse the jury.  It also would unnecessarily delay trial and waste 
time by requiring the government to put in rebuttal evidence 
otherwise not relevant to issues of guilt. 
II. 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM OFFERING EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT 
AT TRIAL REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS  
In his opposition, and consistent with his approach of casting 
baseless accusations against the government throughout this case, 
defendant insinuates that he may seek to raise, directly or 
indirectly, improper arguments at trial premised on vindictive or 
discriminatory prosecution or outrageous government conduct.  The 
government’s instant motion initially focused on the impropriety of 
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defense arguments at trial regarding the unlawfulness or 
unconstitutionality of the searches in this case.  However, in light 
of defendant’s previous unfounded claims of prosecutorial misconduct, 
which the Court has rejected, and the tenor of his current filing, 
defendant once again puts at issue the impropriety of potential 
defense arguments bearing on purported due process violations at 
trial. 
Defendant contends that, “[e]arly in the investigation, the 
government decided that defendant Richard Ayvazyan and a group of 
other people of Armenian descent were involved in a single conspiracy 
and/or scheme to secure” fraudulent COVID-19 disaster relief loans.  
(ECF 417 at 1-2.)  Defendant describes the government’s development 
of evidence against him as a “pre-existing conclusion,” “find[ing] 
evidence that would support the government’s unfounded suspicions,” 
“find[ing] evidence to support its preferred theory,” and seeking to 
“ramrod through a conviction rather than to discover the truth.”1  
(Id. at 2, 6, 7.)   
                     
1 Defendant claims, as he has previously, that the government 
“failed to follow leads that other people used the identities alleged 
to have applied for PPP and EIDL loans -- leads that were apparent in 
the government’s own evidence.”  (ECF 417 at 2.)  Defendant provides 
one example of “an October 13, 2020 purchase at Lamps Plus in 
California” reflected in a Chase bank statement for an account in the 
name of “Turing Info Solutions, Inc.” controlled by “Iuliia Zhadko.”  
(See Exhibit 3 (Under Seal) to the Declaration of Brian Faerstein, 
ECF 219-1, at DOJ_PROD_0000099291.)  Defendant claims that he could 
not have been using the “Zhadko” alias because he was in Turks & 
Caicos at that time.  The evidence demonstrates just the opposite. 
Not only does defendant disregard the ubiquity and ease of online or 
over-the-phone purchases, but also the Chase bank account statement 
in question reflects that the purchase was made through a “Card 
Purchase,” specifying “Card 3537.”  (Id.)  When defendant was stopped 
by CBP in Miami, officers seized, among other things, a physical 
Chase credit card in the name of “Iuliia Zhadko, Turing Info 
Solutions,” with an account number ending in -3537.  (See Exhibit 3 
(Under Seal) to the Declaration of Scott Paetty, ECF 152-1, at 
DOJ_PROD_0000023739.) 
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Defendant’s allegations echo, in type if not in degree, his 
numerous baseless accusations about government misconduct throughout 
this case.  For instance, in defendant’s filings seeking to dismiss 
the case for prosecutorial misconduct, defendant made the following 
unfounded allegations: 
• “[T]he government assumed that [defendant Ayvazyan] too 
must be culpable.  But there was a hole in that 
assumption:  Ayvazyan was not involved in Zhadko’s 
allegedly fraudulent application.  In an effort to fill 
that hole, the government began a pattern of misconduct 
that has plagued this case,” (ECF 289 at 1); 
• “[T]he government attempted to amplify the misimpression 
it had created that Ayvazyan was some sort of ‘ring 
leader’ instead of someone who merely received funds from 
an array of friends and associates including several 
people who had allegedly submitted fraudulent PPP loan 
applications,” (id. at 3); 
• “While shocking the universal sense of justice is a high 
standard, the government’s determination to trample the 
civil liberties while cloaking itself in ‘terrorism’ and 
‘national security’ is so outrageous as to merit 
dismissal, particularly when combined with the consequent 
deletion of evidence and pattern of misconduct,” (id. at 
19); 
• “As a result of its erroneous conclusion based on 
unlawfully seized evidence, the government became 
convinced that Ayvazyan was somehow the leader of what 
the government continuously characterizes as a ‘fraud 
ring.’  The government therefore acted on the unlawfully 
seized evidence to turn Ayvazyan’s life upside down,” 
(id. at 21); 
• “The government has committed flagrant misconduct in 
violation of ethical rules, the Fourth Amendment, assault 
and battery laws, destruction of property laws, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Court’s 
discovery order. As a result Ayvazyan has suffered...,” 
(id. at 23); and 
• “The government’s misconduct began with the unlawful 
interrogation of Ayvazyan at Miami International Airport 
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on October 19, 2020 and has continued into new misconduct 
as recently as the last two weeks.”  (ECF 329 at 1.) 
The Court rejected defendant’s allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct and should not allow defendant to make such claims to the 
jury.    
To the extent defendant intends to argue at trial that he was 
the victim of vindicative or discriminatory prosecution or outrageous 
government conduct (all of which are wholly without merit), he should 
be precluded from doing so.  See, e.g., United States v. Sotelo-
Murillo, 887 F.2d 176, 182 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Whether the government’s 
conduct is sufficiently outrageous to violate due process is a 
question of law reviewed de novo.  It is not an issue for the jury 
and Sotelo was not entitled to a jury instruction on the issue.”) 
(internal citation omitted); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 
1378 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The question of the outrageous involvement of 
government agents is a question of law for the court.”); United 
States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1973) (“question of 
discriminatory prosecution relates not to the guilt or innocence of 
appellants, but rather addresses itself to a constitutional defect in 
the institution of the prosecution”); see also Yagman, 2007 WL 
9724391, at *4 (“Defendant cannot cloak vindicative prosecution 
arguments under the guise of a defense that he has been framed.”). 
III. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM OFFERING EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT 
AT TRIAL REGARDING PURPORTED “TAINT” OF GOVERNMENT EVIDENCE 
Defendant raises another argument in his opposition not 
addressed initially in the government’s motion in limine but that 
warrants a response.  Specifically, defendant contends numerous times 
that he should be entitled to “probe the government’s investigation” 
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to prevent the government from “further benefit[ing] from the taint 
that has infected the government’s indictment and evidence.”  (ECF 
417 at 1; see also id. at 2 (“government has relied on tainted 
evidence to form and repeatedly confirm its flawed central theory of 
the case”); id. at 9 (“the indictments in this case are already 
tainted”); id. (“cut[ting] off questioning regarding its 
investigation tactics gives the government the opportunity to 
directly and indirectly use tainted evidence with abandon”). 
The Court has ordered that a Kastigar hearing be held post-trial 
to determine the extent, if any, to which the government has used 
purportedly tainted evidence in investigating and prosecuting this 
case.  That hearing, not trial, will be the appropriate time and 
place for defendant to explore his theories about allegedly tainted 
evidence.  These legal issues are irrelevant to the jury’s 
consideration of guilt and pose a substantial danger of confusing the 
issues and misleading the jury, and defendant should be precluded 
from raising them at trial.  Fed. R. Evid. 401-403. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in its 
motion (ECF 390), the government respectfully requests that this 
Court exclude defense evidence and arguments that the border stop on 
October 19-20, 2020 in Miami and the residence searches conducted on 
November 5, 2020 were unlawful or that the manner in which law 
enforcement agents engaged in these searches violated defendants’ 
constitutional rights.  The government further requests that this 
Court exclude defense evidence and arguments regarding alleged due 
process violations or allegedly “tainted” evidence. 
 
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