Sentencing Memorandum by USA as to Ahmed M Sary — USA v. Sary (Dkt. 76, D. Md. No. 1:22-mj-01286)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · No. 1:23-cr-00344-RDB · Doc. 76 · 2024-06-18 · Docket on CourtListener

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U.S. Department of Justice 
 
United States Attorney 
District of Maryland 
 
 
Paul Riley 
Suite 400 
DIRECT: 410-209-4959 
Assistant United States Attorney 
36 S. Charles Street 
MAIN: 410-209-4800 
Paul.Riley@usdoj.gov 
Baltimore, MD 21201-3119 
FAX: 410-962-3091 
 
VIA ECF 
 
 
 
 
 
June 18, 2024  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Honorable Richard D. Bennett  
United States District Judge 
United States District Court 
for the District of Maryland 
101 West Lombard Street  
Baltimore, MD 21201 
 
 
Re:  
United States v. Ahmed Sary, Criminal No. RDB-23-344 
 
 
Dear Judge Bennett: 
The Government writes this letter in advance of the sentencing of Ahmed Sary, which is 
currently scheduled for June 25, 2024 at 11:00 a.m.  On October 18, 2023, the Court accepted 
Defendant’s guilty plea to Count One of the Information, charging him with Wire Fraud 
Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349. 
As set forth more fully below, the Government requests that the Court sentence Defendant 
to 114 months’ (9 years and six months’) imprisonment, to be followed by three years of 
supervised release, and order restitution in the amount of $17,901,279.87 to the various victims in 
this case.  
I. Background 
As detailed in the parties’ plea agreement filed October 18, 2023 (ECF No. 66) and the 
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) filed December 20, 2023 (ECF No. 69), for a period of 
nearly two years—beginning in April 2020 and continuing through January 2022—Defendant and 
his co-conspirators (including co-conspirator H.D.) repeatedly defrauded the United States Small 
Business Administration (SBA) and various financial institutions to obtain numerous fraudulent 
Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs). 
Defendant prepared nearly 150 false and fraudulent EIDL and PPP loan applications for 
purported businesses that did not exist in any legitimate capacity and that included false 
information concerning, among other things, number of employees, monthly payroll costs, and 
revenue.  The PPP applications routinely included false and fraudulent Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) tax forms created by H.D. and that were provided to Defendant, along with fabricated 
bank statements prepared by Defendant.  These forms were submitted by Defendant and his co-
conspirators with the PPP applications to substantiate the false representations made in the 
applications.   
Defendant received kickback payments from the loan borrowers in exchange for his 
assistance in connection with the submission of fraudulent PPP and EIDL applications, ultimately 
receiving $2,714,217.22 in kickbacks as a result of the scheme to defraud charged in Count One 
of the Information.  These kickbacks amounted to, at times, up to 30% of the amount of the loan 
amount.    
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Defendant used the fraudulently obtained funds to travel to Dubai and Egypt on multiple 
occasions, to stay at luxury hotels (including the Four Seasons) while there, to purchase property 
in Egypt and to, among other things, open a beachfront restaurant in Alexandria, Egypt called 
Sary’s Kitchen.   
The conspiracy resulted in the disbursement of at least $14,807,609.37 in fraudulently 
obtained PPP funds in connection with more than 85 fraudulent PPP loans.  More than 10 financial 
institutions were victims in connection with the scheme, and Defendant derived more than 
$1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a result of his offense.   
The conspiracy likewise resulted in the disbursement of $3,093,670.50 in EIDL funds in 
connection with 57 EIDL applications.   
In addition to the loan fee kickbacks, Defendant himself received $959,559.00 in 
PPP/EIDL funds for various purported businesses that he controlled.   Defendant’s crimes are 
discussed in further detail below.    
Fraudulent Applications For Businesses Associated With Defendant  
 
As an initial matter, in connection with the conspiracy and scheme to defraud, Defendant 
submitted multiple false and fraudulent EIDL and PPP loan application in connection with various 
purported businesses for which he owned or otherwise had an interest—a purported financial 
services business (AMEX Financial Group), a purported meatpacking business (Am Halal Meat), 
a purported clothing company (Exclusive Menswear) and a purported talent agency (Sary Stars).  
In fact, none of these businesses existed in any legitimate capacity.  Information about each of 
these fraudulently obtained loans are set forth in the below table: 
Entity 
SBA Loan 
Type 
Loan Amount 
Funded Date 
Am Halal Meat Inc 
PPP 
$119,311 
6/19/2020 
Am Halal Meat Inc 
EIDL Advance $10,000 
6/23/2020 
Am Halal Meat Inc 
EIDL 
$40,000 
6/24/2020 
Am Halal Meat Inc 
PPP 
$119,310 
2/20/2021 
AMEX Financial Group Inc 
EIDL 
$145,000 
6/11/2020 
Sary Stars Inc 
PPP 
$102,000 
5/27/2020 
Sary Stars Inc 
EIDL Advance $8,000 
6/23/2020 
Sary Stars Inc 
EIDL 
$117,000 
6/24/2020 
Exclusive Menswear Inc. 
EIDL Advance $10,000 
7/07/2020 
Sary Stars Inc 
PPP 
$102,000 
2/24/2021 
Exclusive Menswear Inc. 
PPP 
$70,326 
6/23/2020 
Exclusive Menswear Inc. 
PPP 
$70,325 
2/11/2021 
Total 
 
$913,272 
 
 
 
Defendant also submitted fraudulent loan applications for a purported pizza business (AMT 
Pizza) that he owned that resulted in the funding of a $65,000 EIDL loan and a $139,938 PPP loan.  
All of these loan funds were ultimately returned to the PPP lender and the SBA in light of suspected 
fraud. 
The EIDL applications associated with each of the above EIDLs contained multiple 
material misrepresentations concerning each purported business’s existence, gross revenues and 
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operating expenses, and each application resulted in the disbursement of funds to bank accounts 
controlled by Defendant.   
 
Likewise, the PPP applications associated with each of the above PPP loans contained 
multiple material misrepresentations concerning, among other things, each purported business’s 
existence, number of employees, and wages paid, and each application resulted in the disbursement 
of funds to bank accounts controlled by Defendant. 
The PPP applications also contained false and fraudulent IRS Forms 1120 (Corporation 
Income Tax Return), 941 (Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return), 944 (Employer’s Annual 
Federal Tax Return) and W-3 (Transmittal of Wage and Tax Statements), which contained 
multiple material misrepresentations including the number of employees of each purported 
business and the wages paid; this information was used to substantiate information in the PPP loan 
applications.   
IRS records indicated that there was no record of business tax filings for any of Am Halal 
Meat, AMEX Financial Group, AMT Pizza, and Sary Stars for the tax years 2019 or 2020. 
Loan Kickback Scheme 
 
In addition to obtaining fraudulent PPP and EIDL funds for his own purported businesses, 
Defendant engaged in a scheme with co-conspirator H.D. to assist other co-conspirators with 
obtaining EIDL and PPP loans for various purported businesses that did not exist in any legitimate 
capacity in exchange for a kickback payment.  Sary would receive a kickback (typically 20% to 
30% of the fraudulent loan amount) in exchange for his services and, at times, would give H.D. a 
small portion of that fee (typically 2% to 5% of the fraudulent amount) if H.D. assisted with the 
fraudulent application.  
 
These applications grossly inflated the numbers of employees and grossly inflated monthly 
payroll costs of the purported businesses.  The PPP applications contained various false and 
fraudulent IRS records prepared by H.D. and provided to Defendant to support the payroll figures 
included in the fraudulent PPP applications, including false United States Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) Forms 940 (Employer’s Annual Federal Unemployment Tax Return, 941 (Employer’s 
Quarterly Federal Tax Return), and 944 (Employer’s Annual Federal Tax Return) for the purported 
businesses.    
 
The purpose of the false IRS and fraudulent Forms 940, 941, and 944 was to circumvent 
Cross River Bank’s requirement and the requirement of other SBA-approved lenders that 
prospective borrowers submit documentation to support the payroll figures that served as the basis 
for the PPP loan amount.   
 
The PPP applications likewise contained false and fraudulent February 2020 bank 
statements prepared by Defendant, which were meant to circumvent Cross River Bank’s 
requirement and the requirement of other SBA-approved lenders that prospective borrowers 
submit documentation to support the certification that the business was in operation on February 
15, 2020. 
 
Regarding Defendant’s receipt of kickbacks in exchange for his work on the fraudulent 
PPP and EIDL applications, in order to conceal the nature of his scheme, Defendant laundered the 
payments through bank accounts he controlled but that were in the names of various associates 
and more than 15 shell companies controlled by Defendant, including the following entities:  Am 
Halal Meat, AMEX Financial Group, AMT Pizza, Sary Stars, Black Diamond Sedan, Diva 
Productions, Vertical Payment Processing, Holand Livestock, NR1 Transport, and Exclusive 
Menswear.     
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The kickback payments were structured by Defendant and made in a manner to conceal the 
nature and total amount of the payments, and created the appearance that the payments were for 
legitimate business purposes—including by containing memos that indicated falsely that the 
payments were for business related purposes. 
Defendant typically demanded that the loan recipient pay him for his services in connection 
with the fraudulent loan application.  After the loan funds were received by the recipient, the 
recipient would typically provide Defendant multiple (sometimes up to seven) checks that were 
signed by the loan recipient and that listed a payment amount and date but that left the payee name 
blank.  Defendant would then write a payee name on each of those checks and deposit them. 
 
In connection with some of the fraudulently obtained PPP loans for purported businesses, 
Defendant also assisted the loan recipients with setting up payroll services with Payroll Processor 
1 to make it appear that the fraudulently obtained PPP loan funds were being used for permissible 
purposes when they, in fact, were not.     
Defendant was aware that proceeds from a PPP loan were required to be used only for 
certain permissible business expenses, including payroll costs, mortgage interest, rent, and utilities. 
Defendant was aware that, under the applicable PPP rules, interest and principal on a legitimate 
PPP loan were eligible for forgiveness, if the business spent the loan proceeds on permissible items 
within a designated period of time and used a certain portion of the loan toward payroll expenses. 
The purpose of establishing payroll services for the loan recipients after receipt of the 
fraudulently obtained PPP loan funds was to facilitate the creation of documentation that could be 
used to substantiate a request for each respective PPP loan to be forgiven.   
Nutscola Street Promotions  
For example, on March 21, 2021, Defendant submitted a fraudulent PPP loan application 
to Cross River Bank for Nutscola Street Promotions (Nutscola), a business for which co-
conspirator L.W. was the owner and resident agent and which had no employees at the time and 
was not in operation.   
The PPP loan application contained multiple material misrepresentations, including that 
Nutscola had 13 employees and an average monthly payroll of $104,900.87.  In support of the loan 
application, a fabricated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 940—Employer’s Annual Federal 
Unemployment Tax Return—was submitted, which falsely indicated that Nutscola’s “[t]otal 
payments to all employees” in 2019 was $1,258,810.53.   
The IRS Form 940 was not legitimate, and the information within it was false; Nutscola 
did not pay any wages to or withhold federal income tax from any employees during the 2019 tax 
year—as confirmed by IRS records.   
Defendant also submitted with the application a fake and fraudulent February 2020 bank 
statement he prepared that purported to be from the Nutscola Chase account.   
Based on the false representations and fraudulent submissions, on March 26, 2021, the PPP 
loan funded, and approximately $262,252 was distributed by Cross River Bank to the Chase 
account controlled by L.W. 
L.W. agreed to pay Defendant a kickback payment for his work in submitting the false 
application and obtaining the fraudulent PPP loan.  After the PPP loan funds were received by 
L.W., he provided Defendant with two checks totaling $78,000—one in the amount of $40,000 
and one in the amount of $38,000—or approximately 30 percent of the PPP loan amount.   
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On each of those checks, L.W. left the payee name blank, and Defendant wrote the payee 
name on the checks.  Defendant made the $40,000 check out to Am Halal Meat, and he made the 
$38,000 check out to Diva Productions—both entities Defendant controlled—in order to conceal 
the nature of his scheme.  Defendant deposited both of the checks, and they were drawn on the 
bank account controlled by L.W.   
Shortly thereafter, Defendant assisted L.W. with establishing payroll services for Nutscola 
with Payroll Processor 1 to facilitate the creation of documentation that could be used to 
substantiate a request for the PPP loan to be forgiven.  In total, $159,000 in sham payroll payments 
were made using funds traceable to the PPP loan obtained by L.W. and Nutscola. 
Yazee, Inc. 
Likewise, on March 14, 2021, Defendant submitted a fraudulent PPP loan application to 
Cross River Bank for Yazee, Inc. (Yazee), a business for which co-conspirator A.Q. was the owner 
and resident agent.  .   
The PPP loan application contained multiple material misrepresentations, including that 
Yazee had 16 employees and an average monthly payroll of $100,289.  In support of the loan 
application, a fabricated IRS Form 940—Employer’s Annual Federal Unemployment Tax 
Return—was submitted, which falsely indicated that Yazee’s “[t]otal payments to all employees” 
in 2019 was $1,203,471.52. The IRS Form 940 was not legitimate, and the information within it 
was false; Yazee did not pay any wages to or withhold federal income tax from any employees 
during the 2019 tax year. 
Based on the false representations and fraudulent submissions made on behalf of A.Q. as 
the owner of Yazee, on March 22, 2021, the PPP loan funded, and approximately $250,723.00 was 
distributed by Cross River Bank to the Wells Fargo account controlled by A.Q. 
A.Q. agreed to pay Defendant a kickback for his work in submitting the false application 
and obtaining the fraudulent loan. After the PPP loan funds were received by A.Q., he provided 
Defendant with eight checks totaling $75,000, or approximately 30 percent of the PPP loan.  On 
each of those checks, A.Q. wrote the amount, but left the payee name blank.  Attempting to conceal 
the nature of the payments, Defendant then wrote a payee name on each of the checks, making the 
checks out to entities that Defendant controlled—AMEX Financial Group, Am Halal Meat, Black 
Diamond Sedan, Diva Productions, Exclusive Menswear, and NR1 Transport.  Defendant further 
attempted to create the appearance that the payments were for legitimate business purposes when 
they in fact were not—including by writing memos that indicated the payments were for business 
related purposes.   
For example, the $5,000 check to Exclusive Menswear contained a memo written by 
Defendant falsely indicating that the check was for “uniforms.”  The $10,000 check to Diva 
Productions contained a memo written by Defendant falsely indicating that the check was for 
“marketing.”  The $10,000 check to NR1 Transport contained a memo written by Defendant 
falsely indicating that the check was for “transportation.”  The $10,000 check to AMEX Financial 
Group contained a memo written by Defendant falsely indicating that the check was for “financial 
planning.”   
Defendant also assisted A.Q. with establishing payroll services for Yazee with Payroll 
Processor 1 to facilitate the creation of documentation that could be used to substantiate a request 
for the PPP loan to be forgiven, which it ultimately was.  In total, $144,647.21 in sham payroll 
payments were made using funds traceable to the PPP loan obtained by A.Q. and Yazee. 
 
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Total Actual Losses Associated With the Conspiracy 
In total, Defendant’s conspiracy with H.D. resulted in the disbursement of $14,807,609.37 
of fraudulently obtained funds in connection with more than 85 fraudulent PPP loans. 
 
Moreover, as noted above, Defendant submitted numerous fraudulent EIDL applications 
in connection with his scheme.  Ultimately, $3,093,670.50 in EIDL funds were disbursed in 
connection with 57 EIDL applications which contained material misrepresentations concerning, 
among other things, each purported business’s existence, gross revenues and operating expenses.   
Federal Search Warrant 
Defendant was arrested on April 29, 2022 and, that same day, search warrants were 
executed at the office of AMEX Financial Group located at 1600 Hanover Street in Baltimore, an 
apartment adjoining the office, and Defendant’s residence.  From Defendant’s office and the 
apartment adjoining Defendant’s office, law enforcement seized numerous pieces of evidence 
related to Defendant’s scheme.   
Law enforcement seized over 90 hard copies of files related to the submission of PPP/EIDL 
applications for various entities.  These files contained large amounts of personal identifying 
information—copies of driver’s licenses, social security cards and numbers, bank statements, as 
well as copies of checks, and PPP application paperwork.   
Some of the files contained the false and fabricated bank statements and tax documents 
submitted by Defendant in connection with fraudulent PPP applications.  Law enforcement 
likewise seized numerous kickback checks from entities that received PPP loans.  The checks were 
signed and a payment amount was listed, but the payee was blank.  Law enforcement also seized 
pre-signed blank checks from a number of the entities used by Defendant to launder the kickback 
payments from the PPP loan recipients. 
II. Guidelines Computation 
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the Defendant’s total offense level should be 
calculated as 31 rather than 33, as calculated in the PSR.  PSR at 12.  The PSR correctly applies 
all applicable enhancements and reductions for acceptance of responsibility.  Id.  However, it does 
not include a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 (Adjustment for Certain Zero-Point Offenders), 
which—based on the facts and circumstances of this case—applies here.1 Accordingly, the Court 
should find that the total offense level is 31 and order that the PSR be amended to reflect an 
adjustment under § 4C1.1.   
The Defendant is a Criminal History Category I.  PSR at 12.  Thus, the applicable guideline 
imprisonment range as to Count One is 108-135 months’ imprisonment.   
III. Sentencing Factors Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
The sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support a sentence of 114 months’ 
imprisonment.   
Such a sentence is necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense and protect the public 
from further crimes of the Defendant, as well as to afford adequate deterrence, promote respect for 
the law, and provide just punishment.  It also takes into account Defendant’s history and 
characteristics.  
 
1 Defendant meets all of the criteria for the adjustment under 4C1.1 that are listed in subsection (a) of that 
guideline.   
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Regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense, there is no question that 
Defendant’s offense is serious.  During the most traumatic global pandemic in a century, 
Defendant was responsible for the theft of nearly $20 million in public funds that were intended 
to prop up our nation’s small businesses so that they could avoid economic collapse.  Simply put, 
the total actual loss is in this case is staggering.2  And Defendant stole these funds to line his own 
pockets. These funds—meant to help struggling businesses—were instead used for numerous 
luxury overseas trips to Defendant’s home country of Egypt (and stays at five-star hotels such as 
the Four Seasons), to purchase real property there, and even to open a beachfront restaurant in his 
birth city of Alexandria, Egypt. 
In total, Defendant and his numerous co-conspirators obtained at least $14,807,609.37 in 
connection with 85 fraudulent PPP loans and $3,093,670.50 in connection with 57 fraudulent 
EIDL applications.  Defendant received the PPP and EIDL funds for his own purported businesses, 
of course, and then took a 20% to 30% cut of every fraudulent loan that he submitted for his co-
conspirators.  Again, these are actual losses that do not reflect Defendant’s attempt to steal millions 
of dollars more in pandemic relief funds.  Simply put, Defendant saw an opportunity for “free 
money” from the Government, and he took it.  And his business, his “source of income,” during 
this time period was fraud.  
Defendant lied on numerous loan applications—his own and those of his co-conspirators.  
He prepared bogus documents to be submitted with PPP applications.  He engaged in a 
sophisticated money laundering scheme by laundering the kickback payments he received through 
more than 15 shell companies controlled by Defendant.  He directed numerous other individuals 
in connection with this money laundering scheme.  And he coached fraudulent PPP recipients 
regarding setting up payroll services to make it appear that the fraudulently obtained loan funds 
were being used for permissible purposes when they, in fact, were not.  Defendant served as the 
engine of a massive PPP loan scheme involving easily 100 individuals and purported businesses 
throughout the country.  He was the boss, the mastermind, and the man who put the plan into 
action.   
What’s more, Defendant’s offense was not the result of a momentary lapse of judgment by 
an otherwise law-abiding citizen.  It was not a split-second decision made under financial duress.  
Just the opposite.  When the opportunity arose, Defendant wrongfully took advantage of a relief 
program meant to aid victims of an unprecedented public health and economic crisis by facilitating 
well over 140 fraudulent PPP and EIDL loans.  His actions were calculating, sophisticated and 
protracted—lasting for almost two years.       
Defendant’s choice to misappropriate PPP and EIDL funds funneled critical resources 
away from legitimate businesses that did not survive the pandemic.  Indeed, in the early days of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, people stayed home, businesses closed their doors, and workers were 
laid off.  America was effectively shut down.  In the face of chaos and uncertainty, the Government 
moved quickly to establish pandemic relief programs, like PPP and EIDL, for suffering people and 
businesses. And to get money quickly to people who needed it most, these pandemic relief 
programs relied on applicants to tell the truth.  But in the face of this crisis, Defendant did the 
opposite—he saw an opportunity to enrich himself based on lies, and he took it again and again.   
Simply put, these pandemic loan programs were intended to be a lifeline, not a payday.  
Defendant’s actions were self-serving and inexcusable.  The scope of his conduct was extensive—
with respect to the length of time Defendant perpetrated his scheme, the number of co-conspirators 
 
2 The attempted loss was substantially higher.    
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involved (dozens), the amount of loss, and the sophistication of the scheme.  The nature and 
circumstances of the offense warrant the Government’s recommended sentence.   
So too does the Government’s recommended sentence reflect the seriousness of 
Defendant’s misconduct, provide just punishment, and promote respect for the law.  The PPP was 
designed to be a safety net to keep the nation’s small business in operation during the most 
significant global pandemic in 100 years.  Unfortunately, due to the conduct of people like 
Defendant, a staggering amount of pandemic relief funds did not reach the businesses and 
employees that needed those funds most.  The SBA Office of Inspector General estimates that as 
much as 17% of the disbursements from pandemic-relief programs like the PPP went to fraudulent 
applicants like Defendant.3  Indeed, the PPP had a finite pool of money; during the first round of 
the PPP, the program was depleted in just 13 days.4  Given the high levels of fraud in connection 
with PPP funds, there is a particularly substantial need to promote respect for the law and provide 
just punishment for the offense.   
The recommended sentence will also serve as specific deterrence for Defendant.  
Defendant had numerous opportunities to stop his criminal conduct.  But it instead went on for 
nearly two years.  A long prison sentence is necessary to protect the public from him.  Indeed, 
Defendant is far less likely to commit crime while incarcerated.  And he has made clear that, when 
given the opportunity to lie to get money, he will take it.  The necessity for a significant prison 
sentence to prevent Defendant from committing additional fraud is made more apparent by the 
efforts he took to conceal his involvement in the instant crimes. For instance, his name was not 
listed on the fraudulent PPP loan applications he submitted on behalf of his co-conspirators.  He 
was careful to direct his co-conspirators to provide him with multiple kickback checks (sometimes 
up to seven) that Defendant would go on to make out to various shell companies he controlled to 
conceal the nature and source of the payments.  And, to create a paper trail to substantiate purported 
employees after the fraudulent loans closed, he directed his co-conspirators to a payroll company 
that he had an existing relationship with and had then enlist the company’s services.  In other 
words, Defendant understands how to make his crimes more difficult to detect. 
The need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities is also important in this case.  To 
date, a number of Defendant’s co-conspirators have pleaded guilty and been sentenced by the 
Court for their crimes with Defendant. One PPP loan recipient who received $262,252 in 
connection with the scheme and paid Defendant a kickback of $78,000 was sentenced by the Court 
to 24 months’ imprisonment and six months’ of home confinement.  See United States v. Walker, 
Criminal No. RDB-22-290.5  Another who received $1,018,224 in connection with the scheme 
and paid Defendant kickbacks totaling $177,000 was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment.  See 
United States v. Hopkins, Criminal No. RDB-23-316.6     
 
3 See Small Business Administration, COVID-19 Pandemic EIDL and PPP Loan Fraud Landscape Report, 
available at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-23-09-covid-19-pandemic-eidl-ppp-loan-fraud-landscape (“We 
estimate that SBA disbursed over $200 billion in potentially fraudulent COVID-19 EIDLs, EIDL Targeted 
Advances, Supplemental Targeted Advances, and PPP loans.  This means at least 17 percent of all COVID-19 EIDL 
and PPP funds were disbursed to potentially fraudulent actors.”).  
 
4  See PBS Newshour, It took 13 days for the Paycheck Protection Program to run out of money. What 
comes next?, available at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/it-took-13-days-for-the-paycheck-protection-
program-to-run-out-of-money-what-comes-next 
 
5 Walker’s sentencing guidelines range was 30-37 months’ imprisonment.    
 
6 Hopkins’ sentencing guidelines range was 41-51 months’ imprisonment.  Hopkins had no criminal 
history.    
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Defendant submitted all of these fraudulent loans and nearly 150 others and caused actual 
losses in excess of almost $18 million, receiving kickbacks from numerous co-conspirators along 
the way.  In short, Defendant was the ringleader of the conspiracy and should be punished 
accordingly.  The Government’s recommended sentence of 114 months’ imprisonment here 
appropriately reflects the differences among these defendants while avoiding unwarranted 
disparities.  
It is notable too that pandemic loan fraud cases involving criminal conduct similar to the 
offense conduct at issue here—including the submission of fraudulent pandemic loan applications 
containing fake IRS forms and false information regarding nonexistent businesses during a time 
of national crisis—have routinely yielded significant sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Aqeel, 
20-cr-00583 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (receiving 15-year sentence in connection with conspiracy involving 
at least 14 other individuals, 75 fraudulent PPP loan applications in 2020, and losses in excess of 
$20 million); United States v. Quin Rudin, 22-cr-46 (E.D. Va. 2022) (receiving 10 year sentence 
in connection with PPP fraud scheme in which losses exceeded $40 million and in which the 
defendant and his conspirators prepared fraudulent PPP loan applications backed by fake IRS 
documents in exchange for a fee of 30% of the fraudulent loan); United States v. Joseph Marsell 
Cartlidge, Eric Alexander McMiller, and David Christopher Redfern, 1:20-CR-340 (M.D.N.C. 
2022) (receiving 72 months, 66 months, and 60 months of imprisonment, respectively, for 
submitting fraudulent PPP and EIDL applications with false information and fake tax forms, 
fraudulently seeking approximately $2.7 million and obtaining $1.2 in loans); United States v. Lola 
Kasali, 4:20-MJ-1106 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (receiving 70 months of imprisonment for submitting two 
fraudulent PPP loan applications with false information and fake tax forms, fraudulently obtaining 
$1.9 million in loans); United States v. Tarik Freitekh, 3:20-CR-00435 (W.D.N.C. 2022) 
(receiving 87 months of imprisonment for submitting fraudulent PPP applications, and 
fraudulently obtaining $1.75 million in loans);7 United States v. Adam D. Arena, 21-MJ-05134 
(W.D.N.Y. 2022) (receiving 66 months of imprisonment for his role in fraudulently obtaining and 
laundering approximately $950,000 in pandemic loans); United States v. Joshua Bellamy, 21-CR-
60064 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (receiving 37 months of imprisonment for obtaining and laundering a 
$1,246,565 PPP loan and paying co-conspirator $311,000 kickback in exchange for preparing and 
submitting application); United States v. Hassan Kanyike, 21 Cr. 50269 (C.D. Cal. 2021) 
(receiving sentence of 51 months for after obtaining 4 PPP loans valued at approximately 
$1,000,000); United States v. Leslie D. Bethea, 22 Cr. 52 (E.D. Tenn. 2022) (defendant on federal 
supervised release at time of the offense received 78 month sentence in connection with $20,805 
PPP loan, which she used to finance a trip to a resort in Florida). 
Finally, regarding Defendant’s history and characteristics, it is true that the instant offense 
is Defendant’s first federal conviction, that the crime is non-violent, and that Defendant apparently 
is a present father to his multiple children.  While these points merit consideration by the Court in 
determining the appropriate sentence, they do not support a variant sentence.8  In fact, compared 
to many other defendants, Defendant has benefitted from numerous positive factors in his life, 
including a loving and supporting family and naturalized United States citizenship.  There simply 
 
 
7 The Government understands Tarik Freitekh to be an associate of Defendant.  
  
8 Defendant’s employment history is limited.  Both of the purported businesses listed in the PSR (at 86-87) 
were part of the offense at issue in this case. It is unclear if Defendant has had other employment since he arrived in 
the United States in 2000.  The PSR notes a judgment in the amount of $119,863.25.  PSR at 16.  This judgment 
arises out of the Defendant in January 2017 obtaining a Rolls Royce Ghost vehicle valued at over $100,000—a 
vehicle never recovered—and his default on the installment contract under the loan.  
Case 1:23-cr-00344-RDB   Document 76   Filed 06/18/24   Page 9 of 10

10 
 
are no extenuating or mitigating factors in this case that warrant a downward variance from the 
Guidelines. 
IV. The Government’s Sentencing Recommendation 
In light of all of the factors set forth above, the Government recommends that the Court 
sentence the Defendant to a term of imprisonment of 114 months’ imprisonment to be followed 
by three years’ supervised release.  Such a sentence would be sufficient but not greater than 
necessary to accomplish the purposes of sentencing under the Section 3553(a) factors.   
The Government also asks that the Court enter a money judgment in the amount of 
$3,627,489.22 and order restitution in the amount of $17,901,279.87 to be due and payable 
immediately, with the following amounts joint and several as set forth below in connection with 
the following related cases: 
• United States v. Walker, Criminal No. RDB-22-290 
o Cross River Bank – $262,252 
• United States v. Hopkins, RDB-23-316 – $1,016,224.00 (total) 
o Cross River Bank:  $716,134  
o Celtic Bank:  $291,090 
o Small Business Administration:  $9,000. 
• United States v. Qureshi, JKB-22-0330 
o Cross River Bank:  $250,723.00 
• United States v. Gillespie, RDB-23-321 
o Cross River Bank:  $138,104. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
Erek L. Barron  
United States Attorney 
 
 
/s/                                  
 
By: 
Paul A. Riley  
Assistant United States Attorney 
 
cc: 
Julie Reamy, Esq. (by ECF) 
Jessica Jackson, U.S. Probation Officer (by electronic mail)  
Case 1:23-cr-00344-RDB   Document 76   Filed 06/18/24   Page 10 of 10

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