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FinCEN Advisory FIN-2020-A005 — Cybercrime Exploiting COVID-19 (July 30, 2020)

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CourtFinancial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
Filed2020-07-30

Summary

Advisory FIN-2020-A005, issued July 30, 2020 by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), on cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic. It alerts financial institutions to indicators of such activity and states that it is based on FinCEN's analysis of Bank Secrecy Act data, open source reporting and law enforcement partners. Sections address the targeting of remote platforms and identity processes, including manipulated identity documents and compromised credentials; phishing, malware and extortion, including ransomware; and business email compromise schemes aimed at municipalities and the healthcare supply chain. It closes with SAR filing instructions, asking institutions to use the key term "COVID19-CYBER FIN-2020-A005" in SAR field 2 and the narrative.

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FIN-2020-A005
July 30, 2020
Advisory on Cybercrime and Cyber-Enabled Crime 
Exploiting the Coronavirus Disease 2019  
(COVID-19) Pandemic
Detecting, preventing, and reporting illicit transactions and cyber activity will 
help protect legitimate relief efforts for the COVID-19 pandemic and help protect 
financial institutions and their customers against malicious cybercriminals and 
nation-state actors.
This Advisory should be shared with:
• Chief Executive Officers
• Chief Operating Officers
• Chief Compliance Officers
• Chief Risk Officers
• AML/BSA Departments
• Legal Departments
• Cyber and Security Departments
• Customer Service Agents
• Bank Tellers
SAR Filing Request:
FinCEN requests financial institutions 
reference this advisory in SAR field 
2 (Filing Institution Note to FinCEN) 
and the narrative by including the 
following key term: “COVID19-
CYBER FIN-2020-A005” and 
select SAR field 42 (Cyber Event).  
Additional guidance on filing 
SARs appears near the end of this 
advisory.
Introduction
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
is issuing this advisory to alert financial institutions to 
potential indicators of cybercrime and cyber-enabled  
crime observed during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Many 
illicit actors are engaged in fraudulent schemes that 
exploit vulnerabilities created by the pandemic.  This 
advisory contains descriptions of COVID-19-related 
malicious cyber activity and scams, associated financial 
red flag indicators, and information on reporting 
suspicious activity.
This advisory is intended to aid financial institutions in 
detecting, preventing, and reporting potential COVID-
19-related criminal activity.  This advisory is based on 
FinCEN’s analysis of COVID-19-related information 
obtained from Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) data, open source 
reporting, and law enforcement partners.  FinCEN 
will continue issuing COVID-19-related information 
to financial institutions to help enhance their efforts to 
detect, prevent, and report suspected illicit activity on its 
website at https://www.fincen.gov/coronavirus, which 
also contains information on how to register to receive 
FinCEN Updates.

F I N C E N  A D V I S O R Y
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Financial Red Flag Indicators of Cybercrime and Cyber-Enabled 
Crime Exploiting COVID-19
This advisory addresses the primary means by which cybercriminals and malicious state actors 
are increasingly exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic in cyber-enabled crime through malware and 
phishing schemes, extortion, business email compromise (BEC) fraud, and exploitation of remote 
applications, especially against financial and healthcare systems.1
1. 
See Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release, “Department of Justice Announces Disruption of Hundreds of Online 
COVID-19 Related Scams,” (April 22, 2020); the United Kingdom (U.K.) National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) 
Press Release, “Public Urged to Flag Coronavirus Related Email Scams as Online Security Campaign Launches,” 
(April 21, 2020); Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
Notification, “Defending Against COVID-19 Cyber Scams,” (March 6, 2020); Europol Report, “Pandemic Profiteering: 
How Criminals Exploit the COVID-19 Crisis,” (March 27, 2020); DHS CISA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Public Service Announcement, “People’s Republic of China (PRC) Targeting of COVID-19 Research Organizations,” 
(May 13, 2020); FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) Public Service Announcement, “Increased Use of Mobile 
Banking Apps Could Lead to Exploitation,” (June 10, 2020); and DHS CISA, National Security Agency, NCSC, and 
Canada Communications Security Establishment Joint Advisory, “APT29 Targets COVID-19 Vaccine Development,” 
(July 16, 2020).
FinCEN has identified the following red flag indicators of COVID-19 cyber-enabled crimes  to assist 
financial institutions in detecting, preventing, and reporting suspicious transactions associated with 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  As no single financial red flag indicator is necessarily indicative of illicit 
or suspicious activity, financial institutions should consider additional contextual information and 
the surrounding facts and circumstances, such as a customer’s historical financial activity, whether 
the transactions are in line with prevailing business practices, and whether the customer exhibits 
multiple indicators, before determining if a transaction is suspicious or otherwise indicative 
of potential fraudulent COVID-19-related activities.  In line with their risk-based approach to 
compliance with the BSA, financial institutions are also encouraged to perform additional inquiries 
and investigations where appropriate.  Additionally, some of the financial red flag indicators 
outlined below may apply to multiple COVID-19-related fraudulent activities.  Given that many 
scammers may be directly targeting customers, financial institutions should remain on the alert for 
potential suspicious activities involving their customers.
2
2. 
For the purpose of this advisory, cyber-enabled crime refers to illegal activities (e.g., fraud, identity theft, etc.)  
carried out or facilitated by electronic systems and devices, such as networks and computers.  See FinCEN Advisory, 
FIN-2016-A005, “Advisory to Financial Institutions on Cyber-Events and Cyber-Enabled Crime,” (October 25, 2016).
Targeting and Exploitation of Remote Platforms and Processes
The significant migration toward remote access in the pandemic environment presents 
opportunities for criminals to exploit financial institutions’ remote systems and customer-facing 
processes.  Cybercriminals and malicious state actors are targeting vulnerabilities in remote 

F I N C E N  A D V I S O R Y
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applications and virtual environments to steal sensitive information, compromise financial 
activity, and disrupt business operations.3
3. 
For information related to publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exposures, see U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), “National Vulnerability Database;” MITRE,  
“Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: CVE List Home;” and FBI IC3 Public Service Announcements, “Cyber 
Actors Take Advantage of COVID-19 Pandemic to Exploit Increased Use of Virtual Environments,” (April 1, 2020) 
and “Increased Use of Mobile Banking Apps Could Lead to Exploitation,” (June 10, 2020).  See also FinCEN Director 
Kenneth A. Blanco’s, prepared remarks delivered at the Consensus Blockchain Conference, “Consensus Blockchain 
Conference (Virtual),” (May 13, 2020).
  Remote identity processes4
4. 
For the purposes of this advisory, “remote identity processes” include remote processes for customer onboarding and 
identity verification, as well as authentication of customers for account access purposes.  For more information on 
digital identity standards, see NIST, “Digital Identity Guidelines,” (December 1, 2017), and the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), “Guidance on Digital Identity,” (March 6, 2020).
 also face significant risks, 
which may include:
• Digital Manipulation of Identity Documentation: Criminals often seek to undermine online identity 
verification processes through the use of fraudulent identity documents, which can be created 
by manipulating digital images of legitimate government-issued identity documents to alter the 
information and/or photos displayed.5
5. 
Criminals exploiting identity verification processes will typically use either information associated with a real 
individual’s identity (i.e., identity theft) or create a new fabricated identity that usually consists of a real identifier, 
such as a social security number or driver’s license number, with other fake information (i.e., synthetic identity fraud). 
For more information on example typologies and financial red flag indicators involving identity theft and identity 
fraud, see FinCEN Report, “Identity Theft: Trends, Patterns, and Typologies Reported in Suspicious Activity Reports,” 
(October 2010).
• Leveraging Compromised Credentials Across Accounts: Cybercriminals commonly undermine 
weak authentication processes in attempted account takeovers via methods such as credential 
stuffing attacks.  In these attacks, cybercriminals generally use lists of stolen account credentials 
(typically usernames or email addresses, and associated passwords) to conduct automated login 
attempts to gain unauthorized access to victim accounts.
Financial red flag indicators of this sort of activity may include:6
6. 
Id.  See also Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation, 16 CFR Part 681, app. A.
	
 Pictures in identity documentation, especially areas around faces, are blurry or low resolution, or 
have aberrations.  Pictures in identity documentation or other images of persons in remote identity 
verification	
7. 
Images in identity verification other than identity documentation may include pictures or video of the customer (e.g., 
“selfie” images) taken as part of the financial institution’s onboarding process.
 show visual signs indicating possible image manipulation (e.g., incongruences in 
coloration near the edge of the face, or double edges or lines on delineated facial features). 
	

F I N C E N  A D V I S O R Y
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Phishing, Malware, and Extortion
FinCEN and U.S. law enforcement have observed significant increases in broad-based and 
targeted phishing campaigns that are attempting to lure companies, especially healthcare and 
pharmaceutical providers, with offers of COVID-19 information and supplies.8
8. 
The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and DHS CISA have noted an increase in malware, phishing, and extortion campaigns 
related to COVID-19.  See USSS Press Release, “Secret Service Issues COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Phishing Alert,” (March 
9, 2020).
  Phishing scams 
target individuals with communications appearing to come from legitimate sources to collect 
victims’ personal and financial data and potentially infect their devices by convincing the target to 
download malicious programs.9
9. 
See DHS CISA and U.K. NCSC Joint Alert (AA20-099A), “COVID-19 Exploited by Malicious Cyber Actors,” (April 8, 
2020); and DHS, “Common Scams: Know How to Spot a Fake.”
  Cybercriminals usually send these phishing communications by 
email but may also use phone calls or text messages.  
In these new schemes, phishing scammers will often reference COVID-19 themes, such as payments 
related to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,10
10. Pub. L. 116–136, 116th Congress (2020).
 in the subjects and 
bodies of emails.  Some phishing emails lure victims by advertising ways to make money, such as 
through investing in convertible virtual currencies (CVCs) or via domain names that mimic names 
of organizations, including those that provide or enable teleworking capabilities.11
11. Since January 2020, tens of thousands of new domains have been registered with terms related to COVID-19 and/or 
disaster and healthcare response efforts (e.g., “quarantine,” “vaccine,” and “CDC”), many including or mimicking 
names of companies that provide or enable teleworking capabilities.  U.S. law enforcement agencies have disrupted 
hundreds of malicious domains used to exploit the pandemic.  See FinCEN Advisory, FIN-2020-A003, “Advisory on 
Imposter Scams and Money Mule Schemes Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” (July 7, 2020).  See 
also, FBI Press Release, “FBI Expects a Rise in Scams Involving Cryptocurrency Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 
(April 13, 2020).
  Cybercriminals 

F I N C E N  A D V I S O R Y
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are also distributing malware,12
12. Malware can enable criminals to access compromised computers and computer systems to steal credentials, exfiltrate 
sensitive information through mechanisms like screenshots or keylogging, alter account information, and conduct 
fraudulent transactions.
 including ransomware, through phishing emails, malicious 
websites and downloads, domain name system (DNS) hijacking or spoofing attacks, and fraudulent 
mobile applications.  These techniques can be applied in broader campaigns involving social 
media, such as the recent exploit targeting Twitter and prominent users of the platform.13
13. See FinCEN Alert, FIN-2020-Alert001, “FinCEN Alerts Financial Institutions to Convertible Virtual Currency Scam 
Involving Twitter,” (July 16, 2020).
  Financial 
institutions dealing in CVC should be especially alert to the potential use of their institutions to 
launder proceeds affiliated with cybercrime, illicit darknet marketplace activity, and other CVC-
related schemes and take appropriate risk mitigating steps consistent with their BSA obligations.  
FinCEN assesses that instances of extortion will also continue to grow in the wake of the COVID-19 
pandemic.  So far in 2020, FinCEN has received numerous suspicious activity reports (SARs) 
involving ransomware14
14. Ransomware, a specific type of malware, typically encrypts data on systems in the interest of extorting ransom 
payment from victims in exchange for decrypting the information and giving victims access to their systems again.
 targeting medical centers and municipalities.  Much of this ransomware 
was delivered by exploiting the COVID-19 lures described above.  We expect criminals to continue 
targeting entities that are vulnerable due to their involvement in pandemic response, such as 
researchers working on medical treatments or manufacturers of personal protective equipment.  
In other instances of extortion, criminals are threatening to expose victims and their families to 
COVID-19 if they do not pay the extortion fee.  In almost all cases, criminals require ransomware-
related extortion payments to be made in CVC.15
15. Financial institutions dealing in CVC should be especially alert to the laundering of proceeds affiliated with 
cybercrime, illicit darknet marketplace activity, and other CVC-related schemes.  See FinCEN Advisory, FIN-2019-003, 
“Advisory on Illicit Activity Involving Convertible Virtual Currency,” (May 9, 2019).
Financial red flag indicators of this sort of activity may include the following:
 Information technology enterprise activity related to transaction processes or information is 
connected to cyber indicators that have been associated with possible illicit activity.  Malicious 
cyber activity may be evident in system log files, network traffic, or file information.	
16. Because cyber indicators are helpful red flag indicators that financial institutions can use to identify related suspicious 
financial activity, FinCEN, DHS CISA, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Cybersecurity and 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (OCCIP) offer a broad range of helpful cyber indicator resources, including, but not 
limited to: FinCEN’s Cyber Indicator Lists (CILs), shared through the FinCEN Secure Information Sharing System; 
OCCIP’s CILs and circulars, available upon request; and DHS CISA’s cyber analytic products and services, including 
a comprehensive list of COVID-19-related indicators of compromise in CSV or STIX-formatted XML formats, the 
Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP), and the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) program. 
Public-private and industry partnerships, such as the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 
and open source and commercial cyber threat feeds can also be useful resources.
	

F I N C E N  A D V I S O R Y
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Business Email Compromise (BEC) Schemes
Cybercriminals have increasingly exploited the COVID-19 pandemic by using BEC schemes, 
particularly targeting municipalities and the healthcare industry supply chain.  A common 
BEC scheme involves criminals convincing companies to redirect payments to new accounts, 
while claiming the modification is due to pandemic-related changes in business operations.  
BEC criminals often use spoofed or compromised email accounts to communicate these urgent, 
last-minute payment changes.  In the COVID-19 environment, criminals insert themselves into 
communications by impersonating a critical player in a business relationship or transaction, 
typically posing as providers of healthcare supplies, to intercept or fraudulently induce a payment 
for critically needed supplies.17
17. See FBI Press Release, “FBI Anticipates Rise in Business Email Compromise Schemes Related to the COVID-19 
Pandemic,” (April 6, 2020).  See also Europol Press Release, “Corona Crimes: Suspect Behind €6 Million Face Masks 
and Hand Sanitisers Scam Arrested Thanks to International Police Cooperation,” (April 6, 2020).
Financial red flag indicators of this sort of activity may include the following:18
18. For general BEC-scheme financial red flag indicators, see FinCEN Advisories, FIN-2016-A003, “Advisory to Financial 
Institutions on E-mail Compromise Fraud Schemes,” (September 6, 2016), and FIN-2019-A005, “Updated Advisory on 
Email Compromise Fraud Schemes Targeting Vulnerable Business Processes,” (July 16, 2019).
	

F I N C E N  A D V I S O R Y
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Information on Reporting Suspicious Activity
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Filing Instructions
SAR reporting, in conjunction with effective implementation of due diligence requirements by 
financial institutions, is crucial to identifying and stopping financial crimes, including those 
related to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Financial institutions should provide all pertinent available 
information in the SAR and narrative.  Adherence to the filing instructions below will improve 
FinCEN and law enforcement’s ability to effectively identify and pull actionable SARs and 
information from the FinCEN Query system to support COVID-19-related cases.
• FinCEN requests that financial institutions reference this advisory by including the key term 
“COVID19-CYBER FIN-2020-A005” in SAR field 2 (Filing Institution Note to FinCEN) and 
the narrative to indicate a connection between the suspicious activity being reported and the 
activities highlighted in this advisory.
• Financial institutions that suspect fraudulent COVID-19-related activity should mark all 
appropriate check boxes on the SAR form to indicate a connection between COVID-19 and 
the suspicious activity being reported.  For example, if the activity includes a COVID-19-
related account takeover involving an ACH transfer, financial institutions can select SAR 
field 38a and 38z, and note in the “other” box, “COVID-19 account takeover fraud – ACH.”19
19. For additional guidance on identifying account takeover activity and related SAR filing instructions, see FinCEN 
Advisory, FIN-2011-A016, “Account Takeover Activity,” (December 19, 2011).
• Financial institutions should also include any relevant technical cyber indicators related to 
cyber events and associated transactions reported in a SAR within the available structured 
cyber event indicator fields.  For example, for a COVID-19-related cyber event against a 
financial institution, financial institutions can select SAR fields 42a and 42z (noting in the 

F I N C E N  A D V I S O R Y
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“other” box the COVID-19-related cyber event), and SAR fields 44(a)-(j), (z), including 
email or CVC wallet addresses, malicious domains or URLs, and any other known cyber 
event indicators.
• For cyber-enabled crime involving fraud driven by COVID-19, financial institutions should 
select SAR field 34z (Fraud – other) as the associated suspicious activity type.  Additionally, 
financial institutions should include the type of cybercrime or scheme as a keyword (e.g., 
“COVID 19 BEC Fraud,” “EAC fraud,” or “BEC data theft”) in SAR field 34(z).
• Please refer to FinCEN’s May 18, 2020 Notice Related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019, 
which contains information regarding reporting COVID-19-related crime and FinCEN’s 
Rapid Response Program, and reminds financial institutions of certain BSA obligations.
For Further Information
Financial institutions should send questions or comments regarding the contents of this advisory to 
the FinCEN Regulatory Support Section at frc@fincen.gov.
The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is to safeguard 
the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering and its 
related crimes including terrorism, and promote national security through 
the strategic use of financial authorities and the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of financial intelligence.

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