Court filing
Plea Agreement for Defendant William Sadleir — No. 2:20-cr-00299 (Dkt. 84, C.D. Cal.)
Summary
The plea agreement between William Sadleir and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California in United States v. William Sadleir, No. CR 20-299-DMG, filed March 10, 2022. Sadleir agrees to plead guilty to count seven, bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), and count ten, transactional money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The agreement includes forfeiture terms under which Sadleir waives challenges to the forfeiture of the Forfeitable Property. It lists statutory maximums of 30 years' imprisonment and a fine of $1,000,000 for the bank fraud count, and 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of $250,000 for the money laundering count, each with a $100 special assessment.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Filed March 10, 2022 in No. 2:20-cr-00299; one of 1 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Central District of California |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2022-03-10 |
Cite this document
“Plea Agreement for Defendant William Sadleir — No. 2:20-cr-00299 (Dkt. 84, C.D. Cal.).”
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, No. 2:20-cr-00299, Doc. 84, filed 2022-03-10. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/court-filings/cacd-2-20-cr-00299/2022-03-10-plea-agreement-for-defendant-william-sadleir-dkt-84/
, SHA-256 0900f96744b505311e1f3c272072d7d7625b8ad82fb3e0c079d7485f49a7821d.Full text
Text recognized from a scanned document; may contain errors.
10
11
12
13
14
15
-16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 1of 24 Page ID #:307
TRACY L. WILKISON
United States Attornéy
SCOTT M. GARRINGER
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
GREGORY BERNSTEIN (Cal. Bar No. 299204)
Assistant United States Attorney
Major Frauds Section
1100 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California
Telephone: 213-894-3183
Email: Gregory.Bernstein@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CR 20-299-DMG
Plaintiff, PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT
WILLIAM SADLEIR
Vv.
WILLIAM SADLEIR,
Defendant.
1. This constitutés the plea agreement between William
Sadleir (“defendant”) and the United States Attorney’s Office for
the Central District of California (the “USAO”) in the above-
captioned case. This agreement is limited to the USAO and cannot
‘bind any other federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting,
enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authorities.
DEFENDANT’ S OBLIGATIONS
2. Defendant agrees to:
a. At the earliest opportunity requested by the USAO and
provided by the Court, appear and plead guilty to counts seven and
ten of the indictment in United States v. William Sadleir, CR 20-
299-DMG, which charge defendant in count seven with bank fraud, in
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 2of24 Page ID #:308
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2); and in count ten with
transactional money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 1957.
b. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
c. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing
contained in this agreement.
d. Appear for all court appearances, surrender as
ordered for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond,
and obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
e. Not commit any crime. However, offenses that would be
excluded for sentencing purposes under United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Sentencing Guidelines”) § 4A1.2(c) are
not within the scope of this agreement.
f. Be truthful at all times with the United States
Probation and Pretrial Services Office and the Court.
g. Pay the applicable special assessments at or before
the time of sentencing unless defendant has demonstrated a lack of
ability to pay such assessments.
h. Defendant agrees that any and all criminal debt
ordered by the Court will be due in full and immediately. The
government is not precluded from pursuing, in excess of any payment
schedule set by the Court, any and all available remedies by which
to satisfy defendant’s payment of the full financial obligation,
including referral to the Treasury Offset Program.
i. Complete the Financial Disclosure Statement on a form
provided by the USAO and, within 30 days of defendant’s entry of a
guilty plea, deliver the signed and dated statement, along with all
of the documents requested therein, to the USAO by either email at
usacac.FinLit@usdoj.gov (preferred) or mail to the USAO Financial
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 3of 24 Page ID #:309
Litigation Section at 300 North Los Angeles Street, Suite 7516, Los
Angeles, CA 90012. Defendant agrees that defendant’s ability to pay
criminal debt shall be assessed based on the completed Financial
Disclosure Statement and all required supporting documents, as well
as other relevant information relating to ability to pay.
5. Authorize the USAO to obtain a credit report upon
returning a signed copy of this plea agreement.
k. Consent to the USAO inspecting and copying all of
defendant’s financial documents and financial information held by
the United States Probation and Pretrial Services Office.
3. Defendant further agrees:
a. To forfeit all right, title, and interest in and to
any and all monies, properties, and/or assets of any kind, derived
from or acquired as a result of, or used to facilitate the
commission of, or involved in the illegal activity to which
defendant is pleading guilty, specifically including, but not
limited to, $308,058.11 seized from JP Morgan Chase Account Bank
account number ending 3760 (the “Forfeitable Property”).
b. To the Court’s entry of an order of forfeiture at or
before sentencing with respect to the Forfeitable Property and to
the forfeiture of the assets.
om That the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture shall become
final as to the defendant upon entry.
d. To take whatever steps are necessary to pass to the
United States clear title to the Forfeitable Property, including,
without limitation, the execution of a consent decree of forfeiture
and the completing of any other legal documents required for the
transfer of title to the United States.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 4of24 Page ID #:310
e. Not to contest any administrative forfeiture
proceedings or civil judicial proceedings commenced against the
Forfeitable Property. If defendant submitted a claim and/or petition
for remission for all or part of the Forfeitable Property on behalf
of himself or any other individual or entity, defendant shall and
hereby does withdraw any such claims or petitions, and further
agrees to waive any right he may have to seek remission or
mitigation of the forfeiture of the Forfeitable Property. Defendant
further waives any and all notice requirements of 18 U.S.C. §
983 (a) (1) (A).
£. Not to assist any other individual in any effort
falsely to contest the forfeiture of the Forfeitable Property.
om Not to claim that reasonable cause to seize the
Forfeitable Property was lacking.
h. To prevent the transfer, sale, destruction, or loss
of the Forfeitable Property to the extent defendant has the ability
to do so.
i. That forfeiture of Forfeitable Property shall not be
counted toward satisfaction of any special assessment, fine,
restitution, costs, or other penalty the Court may impose.
j. With respect to any criminal forfeiture ordered as a
result of this plea agreement, defendant waives: (1) the
requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and 43(a)
regarding notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument,
announcements of the forfeiture at sentencing, and incorporation of
the forfeiture in the judgment; (2) all constitutional and statutory
challenges to the forfeiture (including by direct appeal, habeas
corpus or any other means); and (3) all constitutional, legal, and
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 5of24 Page ID #:311
equitable defenses to the forfeiture of the Forfeitable Property in
any proceeding on any grounds including, without limitation, that
the forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine or punishment.
Defendant acknowledges that the forfeiture of the Forfeitable
Property is part of the sentence that may be imposed in this case
and waives any failure by the Court to advise defendant of this,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) (1) (J), at the
time the Court accepts defendant’s guilty plea.
THE USAO’S OBLIGATIONS
4. The USAO agrees to:
a. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
b. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing
contained in this agreement.
om At the time of sentencing, move to dismiss the
remaining counts of the indictment as against defendant. Defendant
agrees, however, that at the time of sentencing the Court may
consider any dismissed charges in determining the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range, the propriety and extent of any
departure from that range, and the sentence to be imposed.
d. At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant
demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offense up to
and including the time of sentencing, recommend a two-level
reduction in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move
for an additional one-level reduction if available under that
section.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 6of 24 Page ID #:312
e. Recommend that the Court impose a sentence that runs
concurrently with the sentence imposed in United States v. William
Sadleir, CR 20-320-PAE (S.D.N.Y.).
f. Except for criminal tax violations (including
conspiracy to commit such violations chargeable under 18 U.S.C.
§ 371), not further criminally prosecute defendant for violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1014, 1028, 1028A, 1029, 1341, 1343, 1344, 1956,
or 1957, arising out of defendant’s conduct described in the agreed-
to factual basis set forth in this agreement. Defendant understands
that the USAO is free to criminally prosecute defendant for any
other unlawful past conduct or any unlawful conduct that occurs
after the date of this agreement. Defendant agrees that at the time
of sentencing the Court may consider the uncharged conduct in
determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the
propriety and extent of any departure from that range, and the
sentence to be imposed after consideration of the Sentencing
Guidelines and all other relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
NATURE OF THE OFFENSE
5. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of
the crime charged in count seven, that is, bank fraud, in violation
of 18 U.S.c. § 1344(2), the following must be true: First, defendant
knowingly devised a plan or scheme to obtain money or property from
the financial institution specified in the indictment by false
promises or statements. Second, the promises or statements were
material, that is, they had a natural tendency to influence, or were
capable of influencing, a financial institution to part with money
or property. Third, defendant acted with the intent to defraud.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 7of24 Page ID #:313
Fourth, the financial institution was federally chartered or
insured.
A defendant’s belief that the victims of the fraud will be paid
in the future or will sustain no economic loss is no defense to the
crime.
6. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of
the crime charged in count ten, that is, transactional money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, the following must be
true: First, defendant knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a
monetary transaction. Second, defendant knew the transaction
involved criminally derived property. Third, the property had a
value greater than $10,000. Fourth, the property was, in fact,
derived from one or more of the specified unlawful activities
alleged in the indictment. Fifth, the transaction occurred in the
United States.
The term “monetary transaction” means the deposit, withdrawal,
transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate commerce, of funds
or a monetary instrument by, through, or to a financial institution.
The term “criminally derived property” means any property
constituting, or derived from, the proceeds obtained from a criminal
offense. The government must prove that defendant knew that the
property involved in the monetary transaction constituted, or was
derived from, proceeds obtained by some criminal offense. The
government does not have to prove that defendant knew the precise
nature of that criminal offense, or knew the property involved in
the transaction represented the proceeds of one or more of the
specified unlawful activities alleged in the indictment.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 8 of 24 Page ID #:314
Although the government must prove that, of the property at
issue more than $10,000 was criminally derived, the government does
not have to prove that all the property at issue was criminally
derived.
PENALTIES AND RESTITUTION
7. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence
that the Court can impose for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) is:
30 years’ imprisonment; a five-year period of supervised release; a
fine of $1,000,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting
from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special
assessment of $100.
8. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence
that the Court can impose for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is: 10
years’ imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a
fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting
from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special
assessment of $100.
9. Defendant understands, therefore, that the total maximum
sentence for all offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is:
50 years’ imprisonment, a five-year period of supervised release, a
fine of $1,500,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting
from the offenses, whichever is greatest, and a mandatory special
assessment of $200.
10. Defendant understands that defendant will be required to
pay full restitution to the victims of the offenses to which
defendant is pleading guilty. Defendant agrees that, in return for
the USAO’s compliance with its obligations under this agreement, the
Court may order restitution to persons other than the victims of the
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 9of 24 Page ID #:315
offense to which defendant is pleading guilty and in amounts greater
than those alleged in the count to which defendant is pleading
guilty. In particular, defendant agrees that the Court may order
restitution to any victim of any of the following for any losses
suffered by that victim as a result: (a) any relevant conduct, as
defined in U.S.S.G. § 1Bl1.3, in connection with the offense to which
defendant is pleading guilty; and (b) any counts dismissed and
charges not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement as well as all
relevant conduct, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, in connection with
those counts and charges. The parties currently believe that the
applicable amount of restitution is approximately $282,566.89, but
recognize and agree that this amount could change based on facts
that come to the attention of the parties prior to sentencing.
ll. Defendant understands that supervised release is a period
of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be
subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant
understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions
of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to
prison for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized
by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of supervised
release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of
imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
12. Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant
may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic
rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm,
the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury.
Defendant understands that he is pleading guilty to a felony and
that it is a federal crime for a convicted felon to possess a
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(
Pase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 10o0f 24 Page ID #:316
firearm or ammunition. Defendant understands that the conviction in
this case may also subject defendant to various other collateral
consequences, including but not limited to revocation of probation,
parole, or supervised release in another case and suspension or
revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that
unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to
withdraw defendant’s guilty plea.
13. Defendant and his counsel have discussed the fact that,
and defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States
citizen, the conviction in this case makes it practically inevitable
and a virtual certainty that defendant will be removed or deported
from the United States. Defendant may also be denied United States
citizenship and admission to the United States in the future.
Defendant understands that while there may be arguments that
defendant can raise in immigration proceedings to avoid or delay
removal, removal is presumptively mandatory and a virtual certainty
in this case. Defendant further understands that removal and
immigration consequences are the subject of a separate proceeding
and that no one, including his attorney or the Court, can predict to
an absolute certainty the effect of his conviction on his
immigration status. Defendant nevertheless affirms that he wants to
plead guilty regardless of any immigration consequences that his
plea may entail, even if the consequence is automatic removal from
the United States.
FACTUAL BASIS
14. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of the
offenses to which defendant is agreeing to plead guilty. Defendant
and the USAO agree to the statement of facts provided below and
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 11of 24 Page ID #:317
agree that this statement of facts is sufficient to support the
pleas of guilty to the charges described in this agreement and to
establish the Sentencing Guidelines factors set forth in paragraph
15 below, but is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts
relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to
either party that relate to that conduct.
On April 7, 2020, defendant, in Los Angeles County, within the
Central District of California, and with the specific intent to
defraud Bank A and the Small Business Administration (“SBA”),
executed a plan and scheme to obtain money from Bank A, a financial
institution that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured,
by material false promises and statements.
On May 1, 2020, defendant, in Los Angeles County, within the
Central District of California, knowingly engaged in a monetary
transaction, knowing that the transaction involved more than $10,000
in criminally derived property that defendant knew he derived from
bank fraud.
Specifically, defendant, a resident of Beverly Hills,
California, was a film industry executive who operated Aviron
Pictures LLC (“Aviron Pictures”), a Los Angeles, California-based
film production company, and its related entities, including Aviron
Group LLC (“Aviron Group”), Aviron Releasing LLC DBA Regatta
(“Aviron Releasing”), and Aviron Licensing LLC (“Aviron Licensing”)
(collectively, “the Aviron companies”).
In December 2019, defendant was terminated from his managerial
position at Aviron Pictures when Aviron’s largest investor,
BlackRock Multi-Sector Income Trust (“Blackrock”), discovered that
defendant stole funds that had been invested into Aviron Pictures.
11
10
il
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 12 of 24 Page ID #:318
Thereafter, Blackrock began the process of terminating Aviron
Pictures employees and shutting down the company. By early 2020,
Aviron Pictures had fewer than 10 employees, and Aviron Group,
Aviron Releasing, and Aviron Licensing had no employees and were no
longer operational.
In April 2020, from Los Angeles County, within the Central
District of California, defendant submitted fraudulent Paycheck
Protection Program ("PPP") loan applications on behalf of Aviron
Group, Aviron Releasing, and Aviron Licensing through which
defendant falsely represented to the SBA and the SBA’s
administrating financial institution, Bank A, that each company was
operational, had 33 employees, and was incurring substantial
quarterly payroll costs, and that defendant would spend the PPP loan
proceeds on business operational expenses.
Specifically, defendant, with the specific intent to defraud
Bank A and the SBA, submitted the following PPP loan applications to
Bank A, and in doing so knowingly made the following material false
representations to Bank A:
e On April 7, 2020, defendant submitted a PPP loan application to
Bank A in the name of Aviron Group. On the application,
defendant knowingly and falsely represented to Bank A that
Aviron Group had 33 employees and $236,250 in quarterly payroll
expenses.
e On April 9, 2020, defendant submitted a PPP application to Bank
A in the name of Aviron Releasing. On the application,
defendant knowingly and falsely represented to Bank A that
Aviron Releasing had 33 employees and $224,418 in quarterly
payroll expenses.
e On April 24, 2020, defendant submitted a PPP application to
Bank A in the name of Aviron Licensing. On the application,
defendant knowingly and falsely represented to Bank A that
12
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 13o0f24 Page ID #:319
Aviron Licensing had 33 employees and $224,418 in quarterly
payroll expenses.
Bank A approved the three PPP loan applications, and on May 1,
2020, credited the operating accounts of Aviron Group, Aviron
Releasing, and Aviron Licensing with $1,712,715 in fraudulently-
obtained PPP loan proceeds (“the fraudulent loan proceeds”).
Later that day, on May 1, 2020, from Los Angeles County,
defendant transferred $561,375.52 of the fraudulent loan proceeds
from the Aviron Licensing account to the Aviron Group account, and
$561,062.35 of the fraudulent loan proceeds from the Aviron
Releasing account to the Aviron Group account. Both transfers were
monetary transactions through a financial institution (Bank A), and
defendant knew that each transaction involved more than $10,000 in
criminally derived property that were in fact derived from bank
fraud, that is, the fraudulent PPP loan applications in the names of
Aviron Releasing and Aviron Licensing.
On May 4, 2020, defendant transferred $966,000 of the
fraudulent loan proceeds loan proceeds from the Aviron Group account
to his personal checking account at Bank A. From his personal
checking account, defendant fraudulently used at least $409,103 on
personal bank transfers and expenditures. For instance, defendant
transferred $185,000 to the personal accounts of his wife,
transferred $98,000 to a personal account in defendant’s name, used
more than $85,000 to pay down credit cards held in the names of
defendant and his wife, and expended a substantial amount of the
fraudulent loan proceeds on utility bills, mortgage expenses, and
his personal attorney, among other things. Defendant did not use any
of the fraudulent loan proceeds to pay employees of the Aviron
companies.
13
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 14of24 Page ID #:320
Thereafter, federal agents seized $308,058.11 of the fraudulent
loan proceeds from the Aviron Group operating account, and defendant
returned $1,122,090 of that fraudulent loan proceeds to Bank A. The
resulting loss from defendant’s fraudulent PPP loan scheme to the
SBA, which guaranteed defendant’s fraudulent PPP loans, was
$282,566.89.
SENTENCING FACTORS
15. Defendant understands that in determining defendant’s
sentence the Court is required to calculate the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range and to consider that range, possible
departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the other sentencing
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Defendant understands that
the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, that defendant cannot
have any expectation of receiving a sentence within the calculated
Sentencing Guidelines range, and that after considering the
Sentencing Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) factors, the Court
will be free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence it
finds appropriate up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of
conviction.
16. Defendant and the USAO agree to the following applicable
Sentencing Guidelines factors:
Base Offense Level: 25 U.S.S.G. §§ 2S51.1(a)1), 2Bl.1(a) (1),
(b) (1) (I), (b) (17) (A)
Money laundering +1 U.S.S.G. § 251.1 (b) (2) (A)
Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue that additional
specific offense characteristics, adjustments, and departures under
the Sentencing Guidelines are appropriate.
14
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 15 of 24 Page ID #:321
17. Defendant understands that there is no agreement as to
defendant’s criminal history or criminal history category.
18. Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue for a
sentence outside the sentencing range established by the Sentencing
Guidelines based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1),
(a) (2), (a) (3), (a) (6), and (a) (7).
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
19. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant
gives up the following rights:
a. The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.
b. The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
Cc. The right to be represented by counsel -- and if
necessary have the Court appoint counsel -- at trial. Defendant
understands, however, that, defendant retains the right to be
represented by counsel -- and if necessary have the Court appoint
counsel -- at every other stage of the proceeding.
d. The right to be presumed innocent and to have the
burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
e. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against defendant.
f. The right to testify and to present evidence in
opposition to the charges, including the right to compel the
attendance of witnesses to testify.
g. The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if
defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that
choice not be used against defendant.
15
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
fase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 16 of 24 Page ID #:322
h. Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative
defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other
pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.
WAIVER OF RETURN OF DIGITAL DATA
20. Understanding that the government has in its possession
digital devices and/or digital media seized in connection with this
case, defendant waives any right to the return of digital data
contained on those digital devices and/or digital media and agrees
that if any of these digital devices and/or digital media are
returned to defendant, the government may delete all digital data
from those digital devices and/or digital media before they are
returned to defendant.
WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION
21. Defendant understands that, with the exception of an
appeal based on a claim that defendant’s guilty pleas were
involuntary, by pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving up
any right to appeal defendant’s convictions on the offenses to which
defendant is pleading guilty. Defendant understands that this waiver
includes, but is not limited to, arguments that the statutes to
which defendant is pleading guilty are unconstitutional, and any and
all claims that the statement of facts provided herein is
insufficient to support defendant’s pleas of guilty.
LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE
22. Defendant agrees that, provided the Court imposes a term
of imprisonment within or below the range corresponding to an
offense level of 24 and the criminal history category calculated by
the Court, defendant gives up the right to appeal all of the
following: (a) the procedures and calculations used to determine and
16
10
il
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
pase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page17of24 Page ID #:323
impose any portion of the sentence; (b) the term of imprisonment
imposed by the Court; (c) the fine imposed by the Court, provided it
is within the statutory maximum; (d) to the extent permitted by law,
the constitutionality or legality of defendant’s sentence, provided
it is within the statutory maximum; (e) the amount and terms of any
restitution order, provided it requires payment of no more than
$282,566.89; (f) the term of probation or supervised release imposed
by the Court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; and
(g) any of the following conditions of probation or supervised
release imposed by the Court: the conditions set forth in Second
Amended General Order 20-04 of this Court; the drug testing
conditions mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a) (5) and 3583(d); and the
alcohol and drug use conditions authorized by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563 (b) (7).
23. The USAO agrees that, provided (a) all portions of the
sentence are at or below the statutory maximum specified above and
(b) the Court imposes a term of imprisonment within or above the
range corresponding to an offense level of 23 and the criminal
history category calculated by the Court, the USAO gives up its
right to appeal any portion of the sentence.
WAIVER OF COLLATERAL ATTACK
24. Defendant also gives up any right to bring a post-
conviction collateral attack on the convictions or sentence,
including any order of restitution, except a post-conviction
collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a claim of newly discovered evidence, or an explicitly
retroactive change in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines,
sentencing statutes, or statutes of conviction. Defendant
17
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(ase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 18o0f24 Page ID #:324
understands that this waiver includes, but is not limited to,
arguments that the statutes to which defendant is pleading guilty is
unconstitutional, and any and all claims that the statement of facts
provided herein is insufficient to support defendant’s pleas of
guilty.
RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA
25. Defendant agrees that if, after entering a guilty plea
pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds
in withdrawing defendant’s guilty pleas on any basis other than a
claim and finding that entry into this plea agreement was
involuntary, then (a) the USAO will be relieved of all of its
obligations under this agreement; and (b) should the USAO choose to
pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result
of this agreement, then (i) any applicable statute of limitations
will be tolled between the date of defendant’s signing of this
agreement and the filing commencing any such action; and
(ii) defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute
of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy
trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent
that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant’s signing
this agreement.
RESULT OF VACATUR, REVERSAL OR_ SET-ASIDE
26. Defendant agrees that if the counts of conviction are
vacated, reversed, or set aside, both the USAO and defendant will be
released from all their obligations under this agreement.
18
10
il
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Kase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 19o0f24 Page ID #:325
EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT
27. This agreement is effective upon signature and execution
of all required certifications by defendant, defendant’s counsel,
and an Assistant United States Attorney.
BREACH OF AGREEMENT
28. Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the
effective date of this Agreement, knowingly violates or fails to
perform any of defendant’s obligations under this agreement (“a
breach”), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. All of
defendant’s obligations are material, a single breach of this
agreement is sufficient for the USAO to declare a breach, and
defendant shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the
express agreement of the USAO in writing. If the USAO declares this
agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have
occurred, then: (a) if defendant has previously entered guilty pleas
pursuant to this agreement, defendant will not be able to withdraw
the guilty pleas, and (b) the USAO will be relieved of all its
obligations under this agreement.
29. Following the Court’s finding of a knowing breach of this
agreement by defendant, should the USAO choose to pursue any charge
that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this
agreement, then:
a. Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of
limitations is tolled between the date of defendant’s signing of
this agreement and the filing commencing any such action.
b. Defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on
the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or
any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to
19
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23. |
24
25
26
27
28
fase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 20 of 24 Page ID #:326
the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant’s
Signing this agreement.
om Defendant agrees that: (i) any statements made by
defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing (if such a hearing
occurred prior to the breach); (ii) the agreed to factual basis
statement in this agreement; and (iii) any evidence derived from
such statements, shall be admissible against defendant in any such
action against defendant, and defendant waives and gives up any
claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that the statements
or any evidence derived from the statements should be suppressed or
are inadmissible.
COURT AND UNITED STATES PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES
OFFICE NOT PARTIES
30. Defendant understands that the Court and the United States
Probation and Pretrial Services Office are not parties to this
agreement and need not accept any of the USAO’s sentencing
recommendations or the parties’ agreements to facts or sentencing
factors.
31. Defendant understands that both defendant and the USAO are
free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information
to the United States Probation and Pretrial Services Office and the
||}Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the
Court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculations and determination of
sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral review that the
Court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculations and the sentence it
chooses to impose are not error, although each party agrees to
20
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
‘24
25
26
27
28
(Case 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 21 of 24 Page ID #:327
maintain its view that the calculations in paragraph 17 are
consistent with the facts of this case. While this paragraph permits
both the USAO and defendant to submit full and complete factual
information to the United States Probation and Pretrial Services
Office and the Court, even if that factual information may be viewed
as inconsistent with the facts agreed to in this agreement, this
paragraph does not affect defendant’s and the USAO’s obligations not
to contest the facts agreed to in this agreement.
32. Defendant understands that even if the Court ignores any
sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions
different from those agreed to, and/or imposes any sentence up to
the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that
reason, withdraw defendant’s guilty plea, and defendant will remain
bound to fulfill all defendant’s obligations under this agreement.
Defendant understands that no one -- not the prosecutor, defendant’s
attorney, or the Court -- can make a binding prediction or promise
regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will
be within the statutory maximum.
NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS
33. Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein,
there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the
USAO and defendant or defendant’s attorney, and that no additional
promise, understanding, or agreement may be entered into unless in a
writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.
//
//
J/
//
21
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(ease 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 22 of 24 Page ID #:328
PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING
AGREED AND ACCEPTED
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA
TRACY L. WILKISON
United States Attorney
GREGORY BERNSTEIN
Assistant United States Attorney
| LiL tank leap)
34. The parties agree that this agreement will be considered
part of the record of defendant’s guilty plea hearing as if the
entire agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding.
3/9/22
William Sadleir
Defendant
PL eae
Date
March 8, 2022
Adam Olin
Attorney for Defendant
William Sadleir
22
Date
C4 J Z02z
Date
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(oase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 23 of 24 Page ID #:329
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT
I have read this agreement in its entirety. I have had enough
time to review and consider this agreement, and I have carefully and
thoroughly discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand
the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms.
IT have discussed the evidence with my attorney, and my attorney has
advised me of my rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be
filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to
or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the
consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises,
inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me
other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened
or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. I am satisfied
with the representation of my attorney in this matter, and I am
pleading guilty because I am guilty of the charges and wish to take
advantage of the promises set forth in this agreement, and not for
any other reason.
. (tenet fo .
LiLitétew ED ale March 8, 2022
William Sadleir ~ Date
Defendant
23
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
pase 2:20-cr-00299-DMG Document 84 Filed 03/10/22 Page 24 of 24 Page ID #:330
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT’ S ATTORNEY
I am William Sadleir’s attorney. I have carefully and
thoroughly discussed every part of this agreement with my client.
Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible
pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that
might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing
Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this
agreement. To my knowledge: no promises, inducements, or
representations of any kind have been made to my client other than
those contained in this agreement; no one has threatened or forced
my client in any way to enter into this agreement; my client’s
decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary
one; and the factual basis set forth in this agreement is sufficient
to support my client’s entry of guilty pleas pursuant to this
agreement.
LLL... FZ $/6/202~
Adam Olin Date
Attorney for Defendant
William Sadleir
24File and source
- File
- 84.pdf
- Size
- 1,375,197 bytes
- SHA-256
- 0900f96744b505311e1f3c272072d7d7625b8ad82fb3e0c079d7485f49a7821d
- Our copy
- 84.pdf