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MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER DENYING APPLICATIONS TO CONTINUE THE SURRENDER DATE OR FOR… — Artur Ayvazyan (Dkt. 1238)
No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW · Doc. 1238 · Docket on CourtListener
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL MINUTES – GENERAL
II. Continuance of Surrender Date
Defendants’ requests to continue their surrender dates are denied, largely for the reasons stated in
the opposition papers filed by the government. See ECF Nos. 1225, 1229.
First, Vahe Dadyan requests a continuance so that he may undergo a procedure to remove kidney
stones. Ex Parte App. for Bond Pending Appeal 2-3, ECF No. 1213 (“V.D. EPA”). The Court already
granted a significant extension of the surrender date at Vahe Dadyan’s sentencing, pushing his surrender
date back from 20 days after sentencing to nearly three months later. And moreover, the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) has medical facilities and routinely provides medical services. Defendant’s generic
assertion that the pandemic is “not making things easier for BOP,” id. at 2, does not give any substantive
reason to doubt that his medical issues, including his kidney stones, can be addressed while in BOP
custody.
Second, Artur Ayvazyan and Tamara Dadyan’s requests for a continuance are both premised on
the need for more time to attend to family affairs, specifically, so that they can (1) consult with doctors
regarding a diagnosis and treatment plan for a potential medical issue with their minor daughter, and (2)
arrange care for Artur Ayvazyan’s disabled mother. Mot. to Continue Surrender Date 1-2, ECF No.
1216; Req. to Continue Surrender Date 1-3, ECF No. 1217. However, Defendants have had more than
enough time to make family arrangements. The Court has already permitted both to remain on bond for
a lengthy period after issuing its sentence – Tamara Dadyan was given a month before her self-
surrender, while Artur Ayvazyan was given 1.5 months.
And further, Defendants have had an even longer period to make such arrangements if one
considers the amount of time that has elapsed since their convictions, at which point it was clear that
some sort of custodial sentence was likely. Tamara pled guilty in June 2021, and Artur was found guilty
at trial a few weeks later. This Court granted multiple continuances of the sentencing date, so that Artur
was not sentenced until November 15, 2021 and Tamara on December 6, 2021. Both Defendants
remained free on bond throughout that period. In total, Defendants have had six months to make any
necessary family arrangements; there is no warrant for any additional time.
III. Bond Pending Appeal
a. Legal Background
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3143 creates a presumption against release pending appeal. It provides that a
defendant who has been found guilty and sentenced must be detained unless the court finds:
“(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a
danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released under section
3142(b) or (c) of this title; and
(B) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law
or fact likely to result in—
(i) reversal,
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(ii) an order for a new trial,
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or
(iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the time
already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has prescribed a four-part test. To grant bail, a court
must find:
“(1) that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other
person in the community if released;
(2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay;
(3) that the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact; and
(4) that if that substantial question is determined favorably to defendant on appeal, that
decision is likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial of all counts on which
imprisonment has been imposed.”2
United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). The phrase “likely to
result in” defines the type of question that must be presented, while the term “substantial” defines the
level of merit required. Id. A “substantial question” of law or fact is one that is “fairly debatable” or
“fairly doubtful.” Id. It must be “of more substance” than a question that is merely non-frivolous. Id.
b. Application
Here, even assuming that Defendants could satisfy the first two prongs of the Handy test, the
Court concludes that their appeals either fail to raise substantial questions of law or fact or – to the
extent they do raise such substantial questions – favorable decision would still not be likely to result in
reversal, a new trial, or a qualifying sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iii) or (iv). See Handy,
761 F.2d at 1283.
1. Vahe Dadyan
Defendant Vahe Dadyan argues that his appeal raises a substantial question of law likely to result
in reversal because he contests the sentencing enhancement the Court applied for the amount of loss
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). V.D. EPA 4-5.
Defendant seems to blur two different points. First, Defendant points out that the Court applied a
+20 level enhancement to Vahe Dadyan, corresponding to a loss of between $9.5 and $25 million caused
by the conspiracy as a whole, but in sentencing later defendants, including Artur and Richard Ayvazyan,
Marietta Terabelian, and Tamara Dadyan, the Court applied a +16, which reflects a losses caused by the
conspiracy as a whole of between $1.5 and $3.5 million. Second, Defendant seizes on a statement by the
Court at a later sentencing hearing for other defendants. There, counsel for the government sought a
2
Handy was decided prior to addition of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iii) and (iv), which permit release when there is a
substantial question likely to result in a sentence excluding a term of imprisonment or for a term less than the amount of time
served plus expected duration of the appeal.
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higher loss enhancement by pointing out that in Vahe Dadyan’s earlier sentencing, “the Court found that
the loss amount that should apply is the entire amount of the conspiracy,” and the Court responded, “I
probably made a mistake.” Hr’g Tr. 16:16-20, Nov. 15, 2021, ECF No. 1184. Thus, in Defendant’s
view, the Court’s mistake in calculating the guidelines is an issue that warrants release pending appeal.
However, even assuming that this constitutes a “substantial question” of fact or law, it is not one
that, if decided in Vahe Dadyan’s favor, would likely result in reversal, new trial, or a qualifying
sentence reduction. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1283. First, if the Court erred in determining the
enhancement for amount of loss, that error would only affect sentencing and would not present grounds
for reversal of Defendant’s conviction or a new trial. See United States v. Heine, 2018 WL 3745813, *7
(D. Or. Aug. 7, 2018).
Nor would such an error likely result in a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment
or a reduced term less than the expected duration of the appeal process.3 The Court’s sentence of one
year and one day was drastically below the guidelines range of 87 to 108 months. In Defendant’s
sentencing memorandum, he contended that his “role was limited to one loan in the amount of
$157,500.00.” Sent’g Mem. Re: Vahe Dadyan 10, ECF No. 1020. Even if the Court used that amount, a
loss of $157,500 corresponds to a loss enhancement of +10. Given that the base offense level is 7 (and
Dadyan falls within Criminal History Category I), the recommended guidelines range would still be 24
to 30 months – double the term of imprisonment the Court imposed here.
Thus, even if the Court had calculated the guidelines exactly as Defendant Dadyan wishes, it
would still not likely have resulted in any “reduced” sentence compared to the one imposed by this
Court, let alone a sentence without any term of imprisonment whatsoever. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3143(b)(1)(B)(iii), (iv); see also Heine, 2018 WL 3745813 at *7-8 (holding that fourth Handy prong
was not satisfied where, “[e]ven if Defendants were to prevail on their loss calculation guidelines
argument,” it would not lead to any reduced sentence because the Court had imposed a significantly
below-guidelines sentence in the first place).
Accordingly, Defendant Vahe Dadyan does not present a sufficient basis for bond pending
appeal and his application is denied.
2. Artur Ayvazyan
Artur Ayvazyan presents four issues that he contends are “fairly debatable” questions that, if
decided favorably, would likely result in reversal: (1) the Court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on
multiple conspiracies; (2) the insufficient evidence to support an aggravated identity theft conviction; (3)
the Court’s error in failing to apply a mitigating role sentencing adjustment; and (4) the Court’s error in
failing to permit him to be heard at sentencing. Ex Parte App. for Bond Pending Appeal 5-12, ECF No.
1226 (A.A. EPA). The first two issues relate to the jury’s conviction of Defendant Ayvazyan at trial, but
neither presents a “substantial” question of law or fact. The latter two issues relate to sentencing, but do
3
Since Vahe Dadyan has not yet served any time, the relevant time period under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iv) is the
expected duration of the appeal process. The same is true of Defendants Artur Ayvazyan and Tamara Dadyan.
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not present a question “likely to result in” a reduced sentence that meets 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)’s
criteria.
First, the Court already extensively analyzed the issue of a multiple conspiracies instruction in
one of its previous orders. Order 9-17, ECF No. 664. While the Court will not repeat that lengthy
analysis here, the Court began by noting that “subagreements or subgroups by themselves do not amount
to separate conspiracies.” Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697, 722 (9th Cir. 2020);
United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 587 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Torres, 869 F.3d 1089,
1102 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Job, 871 F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Mincoff,
574 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1248 n. 34 (9th Cir.
2004)). A multiple conspiracies instruction is only warranted when the conspiracies are “separate from”
and “unrelated to” each other. Id. at 10 (citing Job, 871 F.3d at 868; Torres, 869 F.3d at 1101;
Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1247).
The Court also noted that “a person ‘may become a member of a conspiracy without full
knowledge of all the details of the unlawful scheme or the names, identities, or locations of all of the
other members.’” Id. (citing Ninth Circuit Crim. Model Jury Instructions 8.23 (Conspiracy—Knowledge
of and Association with other Coconspirators)). Then, after a detailed examination of the evidence, see
id. at 11-14, the Court concluded that “no reasonable juror could reasonably find two separate and
unrelated conspiracies.” Id. at 14.
Defendant Ayvazyan argues that the lack of communications between members of the two
purported conspiracies presented a sufficient basis for a multiple conspiracies instruction.4 This is no
different than the argument previously advanced. See id. at 11. It was unavailing then, and it is
unavailing now.
As the Court previously explained, “the overwhelming evidence shows that (1) the two alleged
groups had the exact same objective (i.e., obtaining fraudulent PPP and EIDL loans); (2) both alleged
groups accomplished that goal using the exact same methods (i.e., the same set of fake and synthetic
identities and entities); and (3) all of the defendants – in particular Richard Ayvazyan and Marietta
Terabelian – obtained and concealed their benefits through their coconspirators’ use of these methods.”
Id. at 14. Thus, even if a member of one alleged group did not communicate with – or even know – all
the members of the other group, no reasonable juror could conclude that there were two separate,
unrelated conspiracies that were (1) committing the same type of fraud, (2) during the exact same time
period, (3) using the same fake and synthetic identities and businesses, (4) to submit fraudulent loan
applications from the same addresses, (5) for the benefit of the same individuals. Id. at 12-14.
Accordingly, Ayvazyan’s multiple conspiracies argument does not present a “substantial” or
“fairly debatable” question. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1283.
4
In Ayvazyan’s view, one conspiracy consisted of Manuk Grigoryan, Arman Hayrapetyan, Payrur Hayrapetyan, and Edvard
Paronyan, while the other consisted of Richard Ayvazyan, Marietta Terabelian, Tamara Dadyan, Artur Ayvazyan, and Vahe
Dadyan. AA. EPA at 6.
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Second, Defendant Ayvazyan’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction for aggravated identity theft is similarly lacking in merit to present a substantial question. As
the Court has previously discussed, the search of Artur Ayvazyan and Tamara Dadyan’s home yielded
overwhelming evidence of their guilt. See, e.g., Government Trial Ex. (“GEX”) 10 at 1-70; GEX 57; see
also Order Den. New Trial 11-12, ECF No. 875 (discussing evidence against Artur Ayvazyan). The
search turned up scores of fake and synthetic identity documents, including images of many such
documents on Artur Ayvazyan’s phone.
Defendant’s argument that this overwhelming evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated
identity theft conviction relies on his testimony at trial, in which he denied responsibility for this
evidence. A.A. EPA 7-8. Here, like at trial, Ayvazyan lays the blame at the feet of his wife, Tamara
Dadyan, claiming that she was responsible for all of the fraudulent identity documents found in their
home and even the images of such identity documents found on his own phone. See id.
This argument is simply frivolous. As this Court previously noted, it is “the exclusive province
of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses.” Order Den. New Trial 11 (quotation and citation
omitted). The jury clearly found that Artur Ayvazyan’s testimony was not credible and that it was not
reasonable to believe that he had nothing to do with the fraudulent identities found in his own home and
on his own phone. The jury was entitled to make that finding, and there is more than enough evidence to
support that finding and the jury’s guilty verdict on the aggravated identity theft counts.
Third, Defendant Ayvazyan’s argument that the Court erred in not applying a mitigating role
adjustment at sentencing presents neither a “substantial” question nor one “likely to result in” a reduced
sentence that meets 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)’s requirements. For one, much of Defendant’s argument
essentially amounts to the fact that he was not a ringleader of the conspiracy. For example, he argues
that there was no evidence that he “participated in planning organizing” or “influenced, let alone
exercised, decision-making authority” and that, as the Court noted, “he wasn’t an architect.” A.A. EPA
10. These points speak to why the Court declined to apply an enhancement for a leader or manager role
in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, but they fall short of presenting grounds for a reduction for a
mitigating role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Defendant is not entitled to a mitigating role reduction just
because he “wasn’t an architect.”
Further, as the Court discussed at length in the sentencing hearing, the evidence does not support
a mitigating role adjustment. As just mentioned, there is ample evidence of Artur Ayvazyan’s
involvement in creating the fake and synthetic identities to help operate the scheme, particularly the
evidence found on his phone. See Hr’g Tr. 5:25-6:12, 12:16-22:11, Nov. 15, 2021, ECF No. 1188.
Moreover, the evidence indicated that Defendant also participated in submitting the fraudulent loans –
he even wanted to submit more loans – and participated in distributing the fraudulent proceeds. See id. at
14:20-15:19 (including discussion of GEX 10, which contained a text between Tamara Dadyan and
Richard Ayvazyan that Artur wanted to “do” another fraudulent loan with U.S. Bank).
Undoubtedly, Artur Ayvazyan played a lesser role in the conspiracy that Richard Ayvazyan and
Tamara Dadyan – and his sentence reflected that, including the fact that the Court did not apply an
aggravating role enhancement as it did for Richard and Tamara. But even so, his participation was far
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from that of a “minimal” or “minor” participant. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Thus, the evidence does not
support Defendant’s argument for a mitigating role reduction, and it thus does not present a “substantial”
or “fairly debatable” question of law or fact.
Additionally, the mitigating role issue is also not one “likely to result in” a “reduced” sentence to
a term of imprisonment less than the expected duration of the appeal process – or one without any term
of imprisonment whatsoever. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(b)(1)(B)(iii), (iv). Even if the Court applied the
maximum possible mitigating role reduction, the offense level would have dropped from 27 to 23,
indicating a guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. That range is still significantly above the 36-month
sentence the Court imposed.5 Thus, as discussed with regard to Defendant Vahe Dadyan, see supra
Section III.b.1, Ayvazyan cannot show that the issue, even if decided favorably, would likely lead to a
reduced sentence from the one imposed.
Fourth, Defendant Ayvazyan’s final argument also does not present an issue “likely to result” in
a sentence without a term of imprisonment or for a term less than the expected duration of the appeal
process. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(b)(1)(B)(iii), (iv). Defendant submits that he was denied the opportunity
to be heard at his sentencing, in violation of Rule 32. A.A. EPA 11-12; see Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(A)(ii). Upon a careful review of the transcript of Defendant’s sentencing hearing, the Court
acknowledges that its colloquies failed to “address the defendant personally” to invite him to speak on
his own behalf. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added); see Green v. United States, 365
U.S. 301, 305 (1961) (courts should “unambiguously address themselves to the defendant” to offer
chance to speak at sentencing). Denial of allocution generally constitutes an error that provides grounds
for vacatur of a defendant’s sentence and resentencing. See United States v. Medrano, 5 F.3d 1214, 1219
(9th Cir. 1993).6
However, even if a defendant can point to an error that will likely require resentencing, that
alone is not sufficient to warrant bond pending his appeal. Under § 3143(b), he still must show that the
error, once corrected in his favor is “likely to result in” a sentence that either does not include a term of
imprisonment or that includes a term that is less than the amount of time the defendant has already
served plus the expected duration of the appeal. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(b)(1)(B)(iii), (iv).
When a sentence is vacated and remanded, the resentencing is essentially de novo; a district court
“is free to consider any matters relevant to sentencing, including those not raised at the first sentencing
hearing.” United States v. Audette, 923 F.3d 1227, 1241-42. Thus, Defendant Ayvazyan’s sentence upon
correction of his denial of allocution could be lesser – or greater – than the five years originally
5
The Court sentenced Ayvazyan to 36 months on the conspiracy and fraud counts to which the mitigating role adjustment
would apply. The adjustment would not apply to Ayvazyan’s mandatory, consecutive 24-month sentence on the aggravated
identity theft count.
6
The Court notes that, had this error been brought to its attention earlier, it would have vacated and reimposed sentence after
permitting Defendant to be heard under its Rule 35 authority, which permits a sentencing court to “correct” a sentence that
involves “clear error,” such as this plain error denial of allocution. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). However, the Court was only
permitted to do so within 14 days of announcing the sentence; since this period has elapsed, the Court cannot do so. See
United States v. Barragan-Mendoza, 174 F.3d 1024, 1027-1030 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a court must act to correct
sentence within Rule 35’s time period, otherwise “the district court cannot modify a defendant’s sentence”).
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imposed. But at minimum, it must be at least two years because his conviction on the aggravated identity
theft counts requires a two-year term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Thus, it is impossible that
his appeal could result in a sentence without a term of imprisonment imposed. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Further, since Ayvazyan has not yet served any time, release would only be warranted if his
appeal were likely to result in a sentence less than the expected duration of that appeal. See id.
§ 3142(b)(1)(B)(iv). Defendant Ayvazyan’s application simply concludes that the allocution error is
“reversible,” but it offers nothing to explain why his resentence upon that error’s cure is likely to be less
than the expected duration of his appeal. See A.A. EPA 12. Thus, he has failed to meet his burden on
this point. See United States v. Koziol, 2021 WL 2267444, *5 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2021) (denying bond
pending appeal because defendant failed to show that, if resentenced, his sentence would be less than
expected appeal duration). Indeed, the Court notes that the Ninth Circuit’s median appeal duration is 13
months, far less than the 24 months that is absolute minimum sentence Ayvazyan could receive on
resentencing. See https://jnet.ao.dcn/resources/data-analysis/caseload-data/federal-court-management-
statistics/appeals-dashboard; see also United States v. Avetisyan, 2019 WL 3957845, *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2019) (denying bond pending appeal where, even if sentencing issue were resolved in defendants
favor, the appeal would likely be resolved in less time than the guidelines range sentence of 24 months).
Thus, for the reasons above, Ayvazyan does not present any issue that justifies bond pending
appeal.
3. Tamara Dadyan
Defendant Tamara Dadyan presents two issues that purportedly warrant her release pending
appeal. First, she argues that the Court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Ex Parte
App. for Bond Pending Appeal 6, ECF No. 1228 (“T.D. EPA”). Second, she argues that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel from her former attorney, Fred Minassian, due to a conflict of interest
arising from the fact that Mr. Minassian was himself under federal indictment for obstruction of justice
in an unrelated case. Id. at 7. However, neither argument present a “substantial” or “fairly debatable”
question of fact or law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B); Handy, 761 F.2d at 1283.
Defendant Dadyan’s first argument simply rehashes the same contentions she made in her
motion to withdraw her guilty plea, which are without merit.7 The Court extensively analyzed her
motion to withdraw her plea in a previous order. See Order Den. Def. Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
ECF No. 1193 (“Order Den. Plea Withdrawal”). While the Court will not repeat all of its lengthy
analysis here, Dadyan’s main argument is once again that she was made to sign a plea agreement with a
“false” factual basis that attributed responsibility for all 151 fraudulent loans to her, when she only “did”
four loans. See T.D. EPA 3-5.
7
Indeed, Defendant Dadyan seems to have simply copied-and-pasted much of her earlier motion to withdraw her plea –
including an argument that Mr. Minassian had incorrectly advised her of the sentencing recommendation provided for in the
plea agreement, which she later retracted in her reply papers after realizing that it was based on a misunderstanding of texts
from Mr. Minassian. Compare Mot. to Withdraw 5-8, ECF No. 998, with T.D. EPA 2-5; see also Reply ISO Mot. to
Withdraw 9 n.4, ECF No. 1110.
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As the Court explained in its prior order, this argument is simply without merit because “the
factual basis of her plea agreement never says that Dadyan ‘did’ or personally submitted all 151 loans.
Rather, it states that ‘Defendant submitted and caused to be submitted and aided and abetted the
submission of at least 151 fraudulent PPP and EIDL applications as part of the conspiracy and scheme in
which she was a participant.’” Order Den. Plea Withdrawal 9 (citation omitted). And as the evidence
overwhelmingly shows, Defendant did aid and abet a conspiracy that collectively submitted 151 loan
applications. See id. at 5-6, 9.
“[W]hat Defendant Dadyan seems unwilling to accept” – and is evidently still unwilling to
accept – “is that by pleading guilty to the conspiracy count, she is criminally liable for all of the loss that
was reasonably foreseeable as a product of the conspiracy’s efforts. Given her extensive, upper-level
role in the conspiracy, that includes all 151 loan applications and all of the loss associated with those
applications.” Id. at 10-11 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990,
1002 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.
2020)). Defendant Dadyan continues to “resist[] the law of conspiracy itself and the legal effect of [her]
actions,” id. at 11, but that does not amount to a “substantial” question of fact or law raised by her
argument. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B).
Defendant Dadyan’s second argument is similarly lacking in merit such as to present a
“substantial” question of fact or law. See id. A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free representation, and a court presented with a
possible conflict has an affirmative duty to inquire about that conflict. Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193,
1195 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)); United States v. Allen, 831
F.2d 1487, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72 (1942)). “Even if
counsel is subject to an actual conflict of interest, however, the trial court may generally allow the
attorney to proceed if the defendant makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.” Garcia, 33
F.3d at 1195 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n. 5 (1978)).
Here, when the Court learned of the possible conflict of interest arising from the unrelated
prosecution against Dadyan’s counsel, Fred Minassian, the Court conducted a hearing to inquire further.
See Allen, 831 F.2d at 1494. After detailed questioning of Defendant Dadyan, in which she insisted that
she understood the potential conflict and risks and still wished to proceed with Mr. Minassian as her
lawyer, the Court concluded that she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the conflict. See
Garcia, 33 F.3d at 1195; Mins. of Hr’g, Jan. 12, 2021, ECF No. 110. Defendant Dadyan’s conclusory
statement that her waiver “was not a knowing and intelligent, and fully-counseled waiver,” without any
supporting facts whatsoever, see T.D. EPA 7, does nothing to rebut this conclusion and does not present
a “substantial” or “fairly debatable” question of law or fact. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B); Handy, 761
F.2d at 1283.
IV. Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, the applications filed by Tamara Dadyan, Artur Ayvazyan, and Vahe
Dadyan for bond pending appeal or a continuance of their self-surrender dates, ECF Nos. 1213, 1216,
1217, 1226, 1228, are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
:
Initials of Deputy Clerk
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