Brief in support of TRO and preliminary injunction — Agudath Israel v. Cuomo (2d Cir.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York · No. 1:20-cv-04834 · Doc. 2-2 · 2020-10-08 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
AGUDATH ISRAEL OF AMERICA, AGUDATH ISRAEL OF 
KEW GARDEN HILLS, AGUDATH ISRAEL OF MADISON, 
AGUDATH ISRAEL OF BAYSWATER, RABBI YISROEL 
REISMAN, RABBI MENACHEM FEIFER, STEVEN 
SAPHIRSTEIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ANDREW M. CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York, in 
his official capacity, 
Defendant. 
Civil Action No._____________ 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
1:20-cv-04834
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... i 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................ 5 
I. 
Defendant’s Selective and Discriminatory Enforcement of COVID-19 
Restrictions ........................................................................................................................ 5 
II. 
Defendant’s Executive Order No. 202.68 Infringes Upon Orthodox Worship 
Services .............................................................................................................................. 8 
III. 
Plaintiffs’ Houses of Worship Protect from the Transmission of COVID-19 ................. 11 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 12 
I. 
The Restrictions on Houses of Worship in the Executive Order Are 
Unconstitutional ............................................................................................................... 12 
A. 
The Right to the Free Exercise of Religion Exists Even During COVID-19 ...... 12 
B. 
Defendant’s Restrictions on Worship Are Unconstitutional ............................... 14 
II. 
Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm in the Absence of Injunctive Relief .................. 20 
III. 
The Balance of the Hardships Tips in Plaintiffs’ Favor .................................................. 21 
IV. 
Injunctive Relief Would Serve the Public Interest .......................................................... 21 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 22
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE
Page(s) 
Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 
784 F.3d 887 (2d Cir. 2015).....................................................................................................12 
Calvary Chapel Dayton Vall. v. Sisolak, 
140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) .............................................................................................................19 
Cent. Rabbinical Congress of the U.S. & Can. v. NYC Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, 
763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014)............................................................................................. passim
Chestnut Hill NY, Inc. v. City of Kingston, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226807 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2017) .....................................................12 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520 (1993) ......................................................................................................... passim
Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347 (1976) ...........................................................................................................20, 21 
Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 
559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009).....................................................................................................12 
Holt v. Hobbs, 
574 U.S. 352 (2015) .....................................................................................................14, 18, 19 
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 
197 U.S. 11 (1905) ...................................................................................................................19 
Jolly v. Coughlin, 
76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996).................................................................................................20, 21 
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 
67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995).................................................................................................20, 21 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) .......................................................................................................13, 18 
N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 
733 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 2013).....................................................................................................22 
Phillips v. City of New York, 
775 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015).....................................................................................................19 
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Roberts v. Neace, 
958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................18, 19, 21, 22 
Soos v. Cuomo, 
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111808 (N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) .....................................6, 16, 17, 22 
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 
140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) .................................................................................................16, 17, 18 
Williams v. Annucci, 
895 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2018).....................................................................................................14 
Ward v. Polite, 
667 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................18 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) .................................................................................................................12 
OTHER AUTHORITIES
U.S. CONST. amend. I ............................................................................................................... supra
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ...............................................................................................................12 
N.Y. Executive Order No. 202.........................................................................................................5 
N.Y. Executive Order No. 202.68........................................................................................3, 4, 7, 8 
Professor Josh Blackman, New York Governor Cuomo: “I’m Going to Say to the 
Orthodox Community Tomorrow If You Don’t Agree Then We Will Have to Close 
Down Your Religious Institutions, Volokh Conspiracy (Oct. 6, 2020) 
https://reason.com/2020/10/06/new-york-governor-cuomo-im-going-to-say-to-the-
orthodox-community-tomorrow-if-you-dont-agree-then-we-will-have-to-close-down-
your-religious-institutions/ .........................................................................................................1
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Plaintiffs Agudath Israel of America, Agudath Israel of Kew Garden Hills, Agudath Israel 
of Madison, Agudath Israel of Bayswater, Rabbi Yisroel Reisman, Rabbi Menachem Feifer, and 
Steven Saphirstein (together, “Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support 
of their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.  The Motion and this 
memorandum are supported by the Declarations of Rabbi Yisroel Reisman, Rabbi Menachem 
Feifer, Avrohom Weinstock, Aharon Weisenfeld, Steven Saphirstein, and Avi Schick, and the 
Exhibits attached thereto. 
INTRODUCTION 
Granting this request for a temporary restraining order is essential to safeguarding the core 
religious practices of thousands of Orthodox Jews.  Absent entry of a temporary restraining 
order on or before October 9, 2020, it will be impossible for Plaintiffs and others to fully and 
properly observe the three Jewish holiday of Hoshana Rabbah, Shmini Atzeres, and Simchas 
Torah, which are observed on October 9–11, 2020.   
Two days before these holidays, Defendant banned thousands of Orthodox Jews from 
fulfilling a core an essential religious tradition that has been observed for more than 2,000 years.  
In doing so, Defendant singled out this religious minority for public scorn at a press conference. 
See Professor Josh Blackman, New York Governor Cuomo: “I’m Going to Say to the Orthodox 
Community Tomorrow If You Don’t Agree Then We Will Have to Close Down Your Religious 
Institutions,” The Volokh Conspiracy (Oct. 6, 2020) https://reason.com/2020/10/06/new-york-
governor-cuomo-im-going-to-say-to-the-orthodox-community-tomorrow-if-you-dont-agree-then-
we-will-have-to-close-down-your-religious-institutions/.   
Defendant concedes that he has never enforced the already existing restrictions on houses 
of worship that Plaintiffs have fully complied with.  Defendant has never contended that Plaintiffs 
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have violated any capacity, distancing, masking, or other safety requirements.  There is simply no 
justification for the unwarranted, unnecessary and unconstitutional restrictions imposed this week. 
* 
* 
* 
Earlier this week, Defendant announced the imposition of restrictions on certain 
neighborhoods, including severe limitations on houses of worship.  In announcing the restrictions, 
Defendant singled out of houses of worship.  In particular, he singled out Orthodox Jews.   
Defendant singled out “[r]eligious institutions” as “the greatest potential” threat to the spread of 
COVID-19, declaring that “[w]e know religious institutions have been a problem.”  Declaration 
of Avi Schick (“Schick Decl.”) Ex. A at 7.  Defendant did so despite recognizing that a “[l]ack of 
enforcement” by “[l]ocal governments” of existing restrictions has “contributed to this problem,” 
emphasizing that “nobody’s doing the enforcement” of COVID-19 restrictions, including “the bars 
and restaurants.”  Id. at 8–9.  
During his press conference, Defendant highlighted pictures of observant Jews as 
purportedly demonstrating “clear violations of social distancing,” wrongly claiming the pictures 
were from “the recent past” (in fact, one photo was of a funeral in 2006).  Id. at 7; see also Schick 
Decl. Ex. B at 10.  Stating that he planned to “meet with members of the ultra-Orthodox community 
tomorrow,” Defendant threatened that “we’ll close the [religious] institutions down” if “you do 
not agree to enforce the rules.”  Schick Decl. Ex. A at 8.   
The next day, Defendant eschewed the logical step of enforcing the existing restrictions 
and instead imposing selective and discriminatory gathering restrictions on houses of worship.  
The following chart identifying the restrictions was released during the press conference.  
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Schick Decl. Exs. C at 2, D at 1.  As the chart indicates, Defendant’s restrictions impose 
discriminatory limitations on houses of worship depending on their geographic location.  Id.  Late 
that night, Defendant issued Executive Order No. 202.68, implementing these restrictions and 
ordering that the restrictions “shall be effective immediately” and “shall be enforced no later than 
Friday, October 9, 2020[.]”  Schick Decl. Ex. E at 2.   
Defendant’s restrictions violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional right of the free exercise of 
religion, guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, for two 
independent reasons.  First, Defendant’s restrictions are facially discriminatory toward religious 
practice as compared to secular activities.  In areas that are in the Yellow Zone, Defendant’s 
restrictions limit houses of worship to 50% of their legal capacity while allowing similar secular 
activities to operate at greater capacities.  In areas that are in the Orange Zone, Defendant restricts 
houses of worship to a 25-person maximum while permitting a range of similar secular activities 
to operate under less restrictive capacity limitations.  In areas that are in the Red Zone, Defendant 
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limits houses of worship to a 10-people maximum while allowing “essential gatherings” and 
businesses to operate under more favorable restrictions.  In each of these zones, Defendant’s 
restrictions are specifically directed at religious practice and thus are not neutral. 
Second, Defendant’s explicit targeting of religious institutions for restrictions demonstrates 
that his order infringes upon Plaintiffs’ religious practices because of their religious nature.  
Although Defendant recognized other activity may present similar or greater risks than houses of 
worship, Defendant admitted that the limitations single out religious practice for special treatment 
that the “rules are most impactful on houses of worship” because “[t]he problem is mass gatherings 
and houses of worship.”  Schick Decl. Ex. F at 8.  Defendant threatened “religious institutions” 
and “members of the ultra-Orthodox community” that “[i]f you do not agree to enforce the rules, 
then we’ll close the [religious] institutions down.”  Schick Decl. Ex. A at 8.  Defendant’s 
contemporaneous statements made while announcing his restrictions demonstrate that he 
impermissibly has singled out religious practice because of its religious nature.   
Houses of worship are a critical component of the religious life of Jews.  Defendant’s 
Executive Order No. 202.68 renders it impossible for Plaintiff synagogues and individuals and all 
of their congregants to fulfill their religious obligations.  Many of the Plaintiff’ synagogues are 
located in the “red zone” of the restrictions, which limits worship services to 10 individuals, 
Declaration of Rabbi Yisroel Reisman (“Reisman Decl.”) ¶ 6; Declaration of Steven Saphirstein 
(“Saphirstein Decl.”) ¶ 6, or the “orange zone,” which limited worship services to 25 individuals, 
Declaration of Rabbi Menachem Feifer (“Feifer Decl.”) ¶ 5.  Under these restrictions, “it is 
impossible to conduct services for all of [Plaintiffs’] congregants” for the Jewish holidays observed 
on October 9–11, 2020, known as Hoshana Rabbah, Shmini Atzeres, and Simchas Torah, 
respectively.   Reisman Decl. ¶ 13; Feifer Decl. ¶ 12; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 13.   
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If this Court does not grant immediate relief barring Defendant’s restrictions, Plaintiffs will 
suffer irreparable harm because they will be prohibited from attending synagogue to practice their 
religious beliefs, which would be “particularly devastating” during the upcoming Jewish holiday 
period.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 10; Feifer Decl. ¶ 9; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 10.  The irreparable injury caused 
by Defendant’s restrictions will fall particularly harshly on Orthodox Jews, who do not use 
vehicular travel on Sabbath or religious holidays and thus are unable to travel to houses of worship 
unaffected by the Executive Order.   Reisman Decl. ¶¶ 16–17; Feifer Decl. ¶¶ 15–16; Saphirstein 
Decl. ¶¶ 16–17.  The public interest favors safeguarding Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. 
Defendant’s Selective and Discriminatory Enforcement of COVID-19 Restrictions 
To combat the “transmission of COVID-19” and the “threat that COVID-19 poses to the 
health and welfare” of the State of New York, Defendant issued Executive Order No. 202 on March 
7, 2020 declaring a disaster emergency in New York.  Schick Decl. Ex. G at 1–3.  In the following 
months, Defendant issued dozens of orders imposing business closures, in-person gathering 
restrictions, and other requirements throughout the State.   
In May, the State announced that it would allow a phased, regional approach for non-
essential businesses to reopen and other conduct to resume, based on regions satisfying certain 
health-related metrics specified by the New York Department of Health.  See generally Schick 
Decl. Ex. H.  Pursuant to that plan, Defendant has exempted non-essential businesses and other 
conduct from his gathering and closure restrictions in certain regions of the State, provided that 
such entities operate subject to Department of Health guidance.  Id.  Among other things, the 
Department of Health Guidance requires such businesses and other conduct to adhere to certain 
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health and safety protocols, which often include capacity limitations on maximum occupancy.   Id.
All regions of the State currently are in the final phase (Phase 4) of that plan.  Id.
For religious services in Phase 4, the State’s guidelines impose a restriction of “no more 
than 33% of the maximum occupancy for a particular area as set by the certification of occupancy 
for services occurring indoor; or no more than 50 people for services occurring outdoors.”  Schick 
Decl. Ex. I at 2, 4.  In Soos v. Cuomo, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111808 (N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020), 
the district court enjoined Defendant’s earlier 25% indoor capacity limitation on houses of 
worship, concluding that they imposed more restrictive capacity limitations to comparable secular 
activity that allowed 50% capacity, such as “offices, retail stores that are not inside of shopping 
malls, and salons,” as well as restaurants, and restrained Defendant from enforcing such limitations 
greater than those imposed for comparable activity.  Id. at *29–30, 35.  
Two days ago, Defendant instituted new gathering restrictions designed to target religious 
institutions.  During a press conference on October 5, 2020, Defendant singled out “[r]eligious 
institutions” as “the greatest potential” threat, declaring that “[w]e know religious institutions have 
been a problem.”  Id.  Defendant showed pictures of religious gatherings while making these 
statements, wrongly stating the pictures were from “the recent past.”  Id.; Ex. B at 5.  Stating that 
he planned to “meet with members of the ultra-Orthodox community tomorrow,” Defendant 
threatened that “we’ll close the [religious] institutions down” if “you do not agree to enforce the 
rules.”  Schick Decl. Ex. A at 8.   
The following day, Defendant again stated that “a COVID cluster problem” is “see[n] [ ] 
in places of worship.”  Schick Decl. Ex. F at 3.  Defendant declared that he intended his restrictions 
to be “most impactful on houses of worship” because “[t]he problem is mass gatherings and houses 
of worship.”  Id. at 8.  Defendant did so despite recognizing that “a lack of enforcement” by “[l]ocal 
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governments” has “contributed to this problem,” id. at 7–8, emphasizing that “nobody’s doing the 
enforcement” of COVID-19 restrictions, including “the bars and restaurants,” Schick Decl. Ex. A 
at 8–9.   
Defendant declared that the restrictions “will be in effect for a minimum of 14 days.”  
Schick Decl. Ex. F at 1, and that “[t]he state is going to take over the enforcement oversight in all 
the hotspot clusters.”  Schick Decl. Ex. A at 9.    
At approximately midnight on October 6, Defendant issued Executive Order No. 202.68 
implementing the restrictions.  Schick Decl. Ex. E at 1–2.  In particular, in areas that are in the 
“Red Zone – Cluster Itself,” Defendant restricts houses of worship to a 10-person maximum limit.  
Id. at 2. The order imposes restrictions on “[n]on-essential gatherings of any size,” but does not 
define or otherwise restrict “essential” gatherings.  Id.  The order likewise exempts essential 
businesses from the restrictions.  Id.
In areas that are in the “Orange Zone – Warning Zone,” Defendant restricts houses of 
worship to a 25-person maximum limit.  Id.  Defendant exempts most businesses in this zone from  
any new restrictions, “[c]losing” only “non-essential businesses, for which there is a higher risk 
associated with the transmission of the COVID-19 virus[.]”  Id.
In areas Defendant determines are in the “Yellow Zone – Precautionary Zone,” Defendant 
restricts houses of worship to 50% capacity.  Schick Decl. Ex. E at 2.  Defendant exempts all 
businesses, including restaurants for indoor and outdoor dining service,  from these “Yellow Zone” 
restrictions.  Id.
Defendant’s order provides that the “directive shall be effective immediately” and “shall 
be enforced no later than Friday, October 9, 2020.”  Id.  The order likewise states that “any 
individual who encourages, promotes or organizes a non-essential gathering as set forth in 
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Department of Health regulation, shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $15,000 per 
day[.]”  Id. at 1.  The restrictions currently apply to areas in the following counties:  Broome, 
Brooklyn, Orange, Queens, and Rockland.  Schick Decl. Ex. J at 8–13. 
II. 
Defendant’s Executive Order No. 202.68 Infringes Upon Orthodox Worship Services 
Jewish houses of worship are a necessary and essential component of Orthodox Jewish life. 
Orthodox Jews pray in synagogues every day.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 2; Feifer Decl. ¶ 2; Saphirstein 
Decl. ¶ 2.  Services conducted on Saturdays and Jewish holidays are particularly important.  Id.  In 
the aggregate, Plaintiffs’ synagogues serve tens of thousands of Orthodox Jews.  See Declaration 
of Aharon Weisenfeld (“Weisenfeld Decl.”).  Many if not most of the individual synagogues serve 
several hundred men and woman each week, and have legal capacities that permit them to have 
several hundred worshippers in the building at any one time.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 2; Feifer Decl. ¶ 2; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 2. 
Defendant’s Executive Order No. 202.68 renders it “impossible” for Plaintiffs’ synagogues 
and their congregants to fulfill their religious obligations.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 5; Feifer Decl. ¶ 4; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 5.  For synagogues in the “red zone,” such as Plaintiff Agudath Israel of 
Madison and Agudath Israel of Kew Gardens Hills, the Executive Order would limit attendance at 
worship services to 10 individuals.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 6; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 6.  For synagogues in 
the “orange zone,” such as Plaintiff Agudath Israel of Bayswater, the Executive Order would limit 
attendance at worship services to 25 individuals.  Feifer Decl. ¶ 5.  Under these restrictions, “it is 
impossible to conduct services for all of Plaintiffs’ congregants” for the three Jewish holidays 
observed on October 9–11, 2020.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 6; Feifer Decl. ¶ 5; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 6.  These 
days are known as Hoshana Rabbah, Shmini Atzeres, and Simchas Torah, respectively.   
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This Friday, October 9, is the holiday of Hoshana Rabbah, which marks the conclusion of 
the Days of Judgment that began with Rosh Hashona.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 7; Feifer Decl. ¶ 6; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 7.  There are special, additional services and rituals that are required of Jewish 
Practitioners that day.  Id.  In particular, there are seven additional prayers followed by the 
traditional beating of a willow branch in the synagogue.  Id.  This tradition dates back two thousand 
years, to the times of the Temple.  Id.  Services also require reading from a Torah scroll.  Id.  These 
services take at least ninety minutes to one hundred and fifty minutes.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 8; Feifer 
Decl. ¶ 7; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 8.   
Defendant’s restrictions render it impossible for Plaintiffs and other Orthodox Jews to 
participate in services on Hoshanna Rabba.  With services limited to ten attendees, it would require 
more than twenty separate services, each lasting at least ninety to one hundred twenty minutes, on 
Friday morning.  Id.  That is simply not possible.  By contrast, under the existing COVID-19 rules, 
Plaintiffs “could utilize all the various spaces of our synagogue to have four services, using indoor 
and outdoor space.”  Reisman Decl. ¶ 9; Feifer Decl. ¶ 8; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 9.   
This Saturday, October 10, is the holiday of Shmini Atzeres.  Services on this day include 
Yizkor, which is the Prayer for Departed Relatives.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 10; Feifer Decl. ¶ 9; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 10.  This prayer is only recited four times a year, and the next recitation is not 
until Passover, in April.  Id.  These additional prayers by men and woman alike are particularly 
emotional, are led by the Rabbi, take an additional fifteen minutes and are only offered only in 
group (rather than individual) prayer.  Id.  It would be “particularly devastating” for congregants 
to be deprived of this prayer on Saturday.  Id.  
Shmini Atzeres is also the only day of the year when Orthodox synagogues read 
Ecclesiastes, which Orthodox Jews accept as the Book of Wisdom.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 11; Feifer 
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Decl. ¶ 10; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 11.  In Plaintiffs’ synagogues, it is read from a parchment and 
requires a trained cantor.  Id.  Under Defendant’s order, it is impossible for Plaintiffs and other 
Orthodox Jews to engage in the Prayer for Departed Relatives and to comply with the Jewish law 
requirements to read Ecclesiastes in a congregate setting.  Id.  Under the existing COVID-19 rules, 
however, Plaintiffs would be permitted to engage in such conduct.  Id.  
This Sunday, October 11 is Simchas Torah, which has a literal translation of Joy of the 
Torah.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 12; Feifer Decl. ¶ 11; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 12.  In celebration of the 
completion of the annual cycle of Torah readings, each congregant is called to the Torah for a short 
reading.  Id.  The Rabbi is then traditionally called to read the final portion of the Torah, after 
which the first portion of the Torah is read.  Id.  These Torah readings, in addition to the regular 
services, take time.  Id.  It is impossible for Plaintiffs to conduct services for all of their congregants 
on Simchas Torah if they are limited to ten worshippers, as there “simply is not enough time to do 
even the Torah readings required of the day, let alone the services.”  Reisman Decl. ¶ 13; Feifer 
Decl. ¶ 12; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 13.  Yet Plaintiffs “would be able to comply with both our religious 
and civil dictates if the existing [COVID-19] capacity restrictions remain in place through this 
holiday period.”  Reisman Decl. ¶ 14; Feifer Decl. ¶ 13; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 14.   
Because Orthodox Jews are prohibited from vehicular travel on Saturdays and religious 
holidays, Defendant’s restrictions also disproportionately impact Jewish Orthodox services.  
Synagogues are tightly clustered around where practitioners reside. Reisman Decl. ¶ 16; Feifer 
Decl. ¶ 156; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 16; Weisenfeld Decl. ¶ 5.  While Orthodox Jews can continue to 
drive to work or engage in other permitted activity outside of prohibited zones, the restrictions bar 
Orthodox Jews principally from attending religious services, as they are unable to travel to 
synagogues outside of their restricted zones.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 17; Feifer Decl. ¶ 16; Saphirstein 
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Decl. ¶ 17; Weisenfeld Decl. ¶ 5.  While practitioners of other faiths retain the option to drive to 
nearby houses of worship outside of their restricted zones, Orthodox Jews are unable to do so.  
Reisman Decl. ¶ 17; Feifer Decl. ¶ 16; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 17.   
Additionally, there are hundreds of synagogues in the areas affected by Defendant’s 
restrictions, Weisenfeld Decl. ¶¶ 2–3, 6, and tens of thousands of Orthodox Jews in New York live 
within the areas affected by Defendant’s restrictions, id. at ¶ 4.  Thus, the brunt of the religious 
burden that Defendant’s executive order imposes is on Orthodox Jewish worshippers, who are 
totally deprived of the ability to participate in religious services.  Reisman Decl. ¶¶ 16–18; Feifer 
Decl. ¶¶ 15–17; Saphirstein Decl. ¶¶ 16–18.  
III. 
Plaintiffs’ Houses of Worship Protect from the Transmission of COVID-19   
Plaintiffs’ houses of worship have adopted health protocols and have altered religious 
congregation to safeguard against the spread of COVID-19.  Plaintiffs’ synagogues have been fully 
compliant with all mandates issued by the State and New York City since the onset of the 
pandemic.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 3; Feifer Decl. ¶ 3; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 3.  Among other things, 
Plaintiffs have split the traditional congregational service into several separate gatherings, which 
accommodates every congregant while still ensuring that congregants maintain proper social 
distancing.  Id.  Plaintiffs require congregants to wear masks during the entirety of their religious 
services, and congregants have fully complied with the mask policy.  Id.
By implementing rigorous health and safety protocols, Plaintiffs have been able to allow 
their members to continue to practice their religious beliefs while still safeguarding from the spread 
of COVID-19.  Since Defendant has conceded that there has been no enforcement against those 
who have failed to comply with the existing rules, he should have demanded enforcement of those 
rules rather than imposing punitive and discriminatory new rules in the Executive Order.   
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ARGUMENT 
In the Second Circuit, the standard for issuance of a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction are the same.  Chestnut Hill NY, Inc. v. City of Kingston, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 226807, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2017).  When pursuing injunctive relief against 
regulation taken in the public interest, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on 
the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction; (3) that the balance 
of the hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved 
by the issuance of an injunction.  Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 
(2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  “A showing of irreparable harm is ‘the single most important 
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.’”  Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec 
Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d 
Cir. 1999)). 
I. 
The Restrictions on Houses of Worship in the Executive Order Are Unconstitutional 
Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that Defendant’s restrictions on gathering in 
houses of worship violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion for two 
independent reasons.  First, Defendant’s restrictions impermissibly discriminate against religious 
practice while simultaneously permitting comparable secular conduct.  Second, Defendant’s 
restrictions similarly violate Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights because they inappropriately target 
conduct because of their religious motivation.  
A. 
The Right to the Free Exercise of Religion Exists Even During COVID-19 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, forbids States from enacting laws providing for the establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
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Laws burdening the free exercise of religion that are not neutral or generally applicable are 
subject to “the most rigorous of scrutiny.”  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 546 (1993).  A law can lack neutrality toward religion in two independent ways, both 
applicable here. 
First, a law is “not neutral” where “the religious ritual it regulates is ‘the only conduct 
subject to’ the” restriction by that restriction’s text.  Cent. Rabbinical Congress of the U.S. & Can. 
v. NYC Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lukumi, 
508 U.S. at 535).  That is, a law is not neutral “if it is ‘specifically directed at [a] religious 
practice.’”  Id. at 193 (quoting Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 878 (1990)). 
Second, a law that restricts practice because of its religious motivation similarly is not 
neutral towards religion, even if its text appears neutral.  To determine whether a law is facially 
discriminatory toward religious practice, a court should analyze “objective factors [that] bear on 
the question of discriminatory object,” such as “the historical background of the decision under 
challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and 
the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members 
of the decisionmaking body.”  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (emphasis added and citation omitted).   
A State “cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of affected 
citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of 
religious beliefs or practices.”  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018), because “[t]he Free Exercise Clause bars even ‘subtle departures from 
neutrality’ on matters of religion.”  Id. (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534).  Religious individuals 
and institutions are “entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair 
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consideration” to religious beliefs; thus, disparate consideration of religious practice compared to 
secular practice fails to act in a manner neutral toward religion.  Id. at 1729, 1732.  
To satisfy the “‘exceptionally demanding’” strict scrutiny test applicable to laws that are 
not neutral toward religion, either by their text or motivation, Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364 
(2015) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014)), the State must 
show that the law “advance[s] ‘interests of the highest order’ and [is] narrowly tailored in pursuit 
of those interests,” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).  
Laws “will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”  Id.
A law fails to advance a compelling interest where government “fails to enact feasible 
measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort” as 
the restricted religious activity.  Id. at 546–47.  A law is not narrowly tailored if “‘less restrictive 
means [are] available for the Government to achieve its goals[.]’”  Holt, 574 U.S. at 365 (quoting 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)).  A law’s 
“underinclusiveness suggests . . . that a more tailored policy, less burdensome to [religious 
practice], is possible.”  Williams v. Annucci, 895 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Holt, 574 
U.S. at 367–38; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.   
B. 
The Executive Order’s Restrictions on Worship Are Unconstitutional  
1. By imposing gathering restrictions on houses of worship, Defendant has burdened 
Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs.  Plaintiffs are sincere practitioners of Judaism who 
believe that attending religious services at the synagogue provides a critical facet to the religious 
practices and beliefs of Jewish individuals.  As discussed above, see supra 8–11, Defendant’s 
restrictions render it “practically impossible” for Plaintiffs “to conduct services for all of [their] 
congregants” for the Jewish holidays observed on October 9–11, 2020, thereby infringing upon 
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15 
Plaintiffs’ ability to “comply with” religious dictates.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 6; Feifer Decl. ¶ 5; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 6.  Because Defendant has restricted the number of individuals that may gather 
at houses of worship, rendering such conduct illegal and subject to penalty, Defendant has deprived 
Plaintiffs of their ability to act in accordance with their sincerely held religious beliefs.   
2.a. Defendant’s restrictions are not neutral because they are facially discriminatory.  
Defendant’s restrictions in each zone expressly impose gathering restrictions on “houses of 
worship” and not other secular conduct.  Schick Decl. Ex. E at 2.   
In areas designated to be in the “Yellow Zone,” Defendant restricts houses of worship to 
50% capacity while permitting all businesses, including restaurants for indoor and outdoor dining 
service, and schools, to remain open.  Id.  These restrictions thus facially target religious practice 
because they are “specifically directed at [a] religious practice.”  Cent. Rabbinical, 763 F.3d at 
193, 195.  Defendant’s order allows schools, including higher education, to remain open at full 
capacity in these regions.  See generally Schick Decl. Ex. K.  This secular conduct that Defendant’s 
order permits to open at greater capacity than 50% similarly constitute gatherings of individuals 
for a prolonged period of time—the very characteristics of public congregation used to justify 
restrictions to combat the transmission of COVID-19.   
In areas designated to be in the “Orange Zone,” Defendant restricts worship services to a 
maximum of 25 people while “[c]losing” only “non-essential businesses, for which there is a 
higher risk associated with the transmission of the COVID-19 virus[.]”  Schick Decl. Ex. E at 2.  
The capacity restrictions on houses of worship in this zone likewise facially target religious 
practice.  The “non-essential” businesses that Defendant’s order permits to open at greater capacity 
than houses of worship include offices, malls, and retail stores, which Defendant allows to open at 
50% capacity.  See generally Schick Decl. Exs. L, M.  These favored secular activities similarly 
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constitute gatherings of individuals for a prolonged period of time that should trigger the same 
concerns relating to the spread of COVID-19 that Defendant claims justifies restrictions on houses 
of worship.  Yet Defendant’s restrictions on houses of worship in this zone facially target religious 
practice, and not such secular conduct.   
Indeed, in enjoining Defendant’s 25% capacity restriction on houses of worship this 
summer, Judge Sharpe in Soos concluded that exempted secular activity such as offices “threaten 
defendants’ interest in slowing the spread of COVID-19 to a similar or greater degree than” houses 
of worship.  2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111808, at *29–30.  The reasoning in Soos applies here.  Thus, 
by implementing gathering restrictions only on religious practice, Defendant’s order is “not 
neutral” because “the religious ritual it regulates is ‘the only conduct subject to’ the” restriction.  
Cent. Rabbinical, 763 F.3d at 193, 195 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535).   
In areas designated to be in the “Red Zone – Cluster Itself,” Defendant restricts houses of 
worship to a 10-person maximum.  Schick Decl. Ex. E at 2.  These restrictions similarly facially 
target religious practice.  Cent. Rabbinical, 763 F.3d at 193, 195.  Moreover, while Defendant’s 
order exempts all essential gatherings and businesses from such restrictions, Schick Decl. Ex. E at 
2, it fails to define “essential” gatherings not subject to the gathering restrictions.    
The denial of application for emergency injunctive relief in South Bay United Pentecostal 
Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), does not direct a different result.  At issue in South 
Bay was a challenge to state law limiting capacity on houses of worship while exempting other 
secular conduct from those restrictions.  Id. at 1613.  Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the 
permitted conduct at issue was “dissimilar” to houses of worship, where “large groups of people 
gather in close proximity for extended periods of time,” because individuals in those secular 
activities, such as “grocery stores, banks, and laundromats” do not “congregate in large groups nor 
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17 
remain in close proximity for extended periods.”  Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the denial of 
application for injunctive relief).  In contrast, the permitted secular conduct at issue here does 
involve “large groups of people [who] gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.”  Id.
Judge Sharpe similarly held that offices “threaten defendants’ interest in slowing the spread of 
COVID-19 to a similar or greater degree than those of” houses of worship, and South Bay did not 
apply.  Soos, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111808, at *29–30.  And neither Soos nor South Bay 
considered permitted secular conduct relating to schools and higher education, which plainly 
involve congregations of large groups of individual in close proximity with one another for 
extended periods of time.  
b. Defendant’s Executive Order is also not neutral because it infringes on the religious 
practices of the Orthodox Jewish community because of their religious motivation.  The day before 
issuing his restrictions, Defendant singled out houses of worship for discriminatory treatment: 
“Religious institutions are mass gatherings and raise the greatest potential” for the spread of 
COVID-19, stating that “[w]e know religious institutions have been a problem.”  Schick Decl. Ex. 
A at 7.  Defendant threatened “religious institutions” and “members of the ultra-Orthodox 
community” that “[i]f you do not agree to enforce the rules, then we’ll close the [religious] 
institutions down.”  Id. at 8 (emphasis added).   
Defendant’s “contemporaneous statements” made when issuing his restrictions on houses 
of worship demonstrate the “discriminatory object” of the restrictions as singling out religious 
practice, Orthodox Jewish practice in particular, “because of their religious motivation.”  Lukumi, 
508 U.S. at 533, 540 (citation omitted).  Indeed, Defendant’s order requires enforcement of his 
restrictions beginning October 9—the beginning of the Jewish holidays, Reisman Decl. ¶ 7; Feifer 
Decl. ¶ 6; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 7, that ensures it will be “impossible” for Plaintiffs and other 
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Orthodox Jews to conduct and participate in services. Reisman Decl. ¶ 5; Feifer Decl. ¶ 4; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 5.  And the brunt of Defendant’s restrictions fall disparately on Orthodox Jews, 
who do not use vehicular travel on Sabbath or on religious holidays and thus are unable to travel 
to houses of worship for religious practice in permitted areas.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 16; Feifer Decl. 
¶ 15; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 16.  Defendant’s conduct demonstrates that he failed to act as a “neutral 
decisionmaker” to religious practice and did not act in a manner neutral to religion.  Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729, 1732.   
3. Defendant cannot satisfy the “‘exceptionally demanding’” strict scrutiny test, Holt, 574 
U.S. at 364 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 728).  Although the State has an undisputed interest 
in stemming the transmission of COVID-19, the gathering restrictions targeted at houses of 
worship are not narrowly tailored.  “‘[L]ess restrictive means’” clearly are available for the State 
to diminish the transmission of COVID-19.  Holt, 574 U.S. at 365 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 
815).  The regulation is massively “underinclusive in relation to its asserted secular goals[.]”  Cent. 
Rabbinical, 763 F.3d at 186.  The exempted secular activity, for all businesses, restaurants, and 
schools in areas in the Yellow Zone and for most businesses in areas in the Orange Zone, in which 
individuals congregate and remain in close proximity for long periods, endangers the health and 
welfare of the public through the transmission of COVID-19 “in a similar or greater degree than” 
do houses of worship, Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.  That plainly proves the regulation’s 
“underinclusive” nature.  Id. at 542–43; see also S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in the denial of application for injunctive relief); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413–
15 (6th Cir. 2020); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.2d 727, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2012).  Such underinclusiveness 
demonstrates that the State’s interest could be furthered by similarly permitting houses of worship 
that implement health protocols comparable to those required of comparable secular activity.  See 
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Roberts, 958 F.3d at 415; Holt, 574 U.S. at 367–68; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
Defendant’s 
restrictions on houses of worship thus fails strict scrutiny. 
4. Even if strict scrutiny did not apply, Defendant’s restrictions on houses of worship still 
fails.  The Supreme Court’s holding in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905), that a regulation to “protect the public health and the public safety” is unconstitutional 
only if it is “arbitrary and oppressive” or “has no real or substantial relation to [protect public 
health], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental 
law,” id. at 25, 31, 38 (citations omitted), does not alter traditional Free Exercise Clause scrutiny.  
See Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Roberts, 958 F.3d at 
413–15.  “Language in Jacobson must be read in context, and it is important to keep in mind that 
Jacobson primarily involved a substantive due process challenge[,]” and “[i]t is a considerable 
stretch to read the decision as establishing the test to be applied when statewide measures of 
indefinite duration are challenged under the First Amendment[.]”  Calvary Chapel Dayton Vall. v. 
Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2608 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive 
relief). 
Even if Jacobson did apply to Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause claim, Defendant’s 
discriminatory conduct would not survive review.  As discussed above, the restrictions impose 
limits on houses of worship while simultaneously allowing gatherings of more individuals for 
comparable secular activity and businesses.  Defendant’s restrictions singling out religious conduct 
for restriction on gathering is “arbitrary and oppressive” and an “palpable invasion of rights 
secured by fundamental law.”  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31, 38.  This is especially so because 
Defendant never bothered to enforce the existing restrictions before issuing these punitive new 
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restrictions.  This demonstrates that the Executive Order was driven by pique toward religion and 
not concern for public health.  
II. 
Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm in the Absence of Injunctive Relief 
Defendant’s restrictions violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and will cause irreparable 
harm.  Courts presume irreparable harm where there exists a threatened violation of constitutional 
rights.  Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996).  “The loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality op.); see also LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 
412, 426 (2d Cir. 1995).   
Closure of houses of worship would require Plaintiffs to sacrifice religious practice.  
Plaintiffs are sincere practitioners of Judaism who wish to worship in synagogue.  But the limits 
proscribed by Defendant’s restrictions makes such worship impossible.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 5; Feifer 
Decl. ¶ 4; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 5.   
The irreparable injury Plaintiffs will suffer is particularly grave during the upcoming 
Jewish holidays from October 9–11, as Defendant’s restrictions make it “impossible” for Plaintiffs 
to engage in critical religious practices.  Reisman Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Feifer Decl. ¶¶ 4–5; Saphirstein 
Decl. ¶¶ 5–6.  It would be “particularly devastating” for congregants to be deprived of engaging 
in communal prayer and rituals during the holiday services.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 10; Feifer Decl. ¶ 9; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 10.  If relief is granted, Plaintiffs “would be able to comply with both our 
religious and civil dictates if the existing capacity restrictions remain in place through this holiday 
period.”   Reisman Decl. ¶ 14; Feifer Decl. ¶ 13; Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 14.  Plaintiffs are fearful of 
prosecution for holding such services, given that Defendant has threatened to impose fines of up 
to $15,000 upon “any individual who encourages, promotes or organizes a” worship service 
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21 
attended by more than the limited number of individuals set forth in the Executive Order.  Schick 
Decl. Ex. E at 1. 
Defendant’s restrictions deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights to exercise their 
religious beliefs by attending worship services.  Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of an injunction, Elrod, 427 U.S. at 473; Jolly, 76 F.3d at 482; LeBlanc-Sternberg, 67 
F.3d at 426, and a subsequent award of damages cannot undo or compensate for that harm.     
III. 
The Balance of the Hardships Tips in Plaintiffs’ Favor 
The balance of the hardships also favors granting the requested injunction.  As 
demonstrated above, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief.   
By contrast, Defendant will suffer no meaningful harm if the Court issues the injunction.  
Plaintiffs have guarded against the spread of COVID-19 and have been fully compliant with all 
State and local mandates since the onset of the pandemic.  Reisman Decl. ¶ 3; Feifer Decl. ¶ 3; 
Saphirstein Decl. ¶ 3.  Plaintiffs have implemented health and safety protocols that include, among 
other things, requiring congregants to wear masks during services and splitting services into small 
gatherings to ensure proper social distancing.  Id.  By adhering to these rigorous health and safety 
protocols, Plaintiffs have ensured no outbreak of COVID-19 has occurred among their 
congregants.  Id.  Plaintiffs simply seek injunctive relief that “appropriately permits religious 
services with the same risk-minimizing precautions as similar activities.”  Roberts, 958 F.3d at 
416.  The balance of the equities thus plainly favors Plaintiffs.  During any injunction period, 
Defendant can enforce the existing restrictions that he concedes he has never bothered to enforce.  
IV. 
Injunctive Relief Would Serve the Public Interest  
Injunctive relief would benefit the public interest in protecting Plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights and in treating religious and secular conduct in comparable ways.  “[S]ecuring First 
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